Academic Exchanges with the USSR
An Analysis and Evaluation of Provisions Under the General Exchanges Agreement

Report by
Jocelyn Maynard Ghent
Prepared for the Office of International Relations

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
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FORLWORD

In January 1979, in the context of an overall review of its programs, the Office of International Relations of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada commissioned an independent consultant, Dr. Jocelyn Ghent, to prepare a report on the history and evolution of its academic exchanges with the Soviet Union. The terms of reference assigned to Dr. Ghent were as follows:

> to review the activities under the exchange agreements between Canada and the USSR, from 1971 to the present, with particular attention to the development and directions of scholarly interest on the part of the Canadian academic community in relations with their colleagues from the USSR;
>
> to examine the main problems which have been encountered by Canadian scholars in the USSR as well as by the Canadian scholars who have acted as hosts to Russian scholars;
>
> to assess the effectiveness and the scholarly value to the Canadian academic community of these agreements;
>
> to present recommendations, where appropriate, which would serve the programs' purposes.

The following report is the fruit of Dr. Ghent's research. Although the report was commissioned by the SSHRC, Dr. Ghent carried out her work independently, and the analysis and conclusions are her own. Dr. Ghent conducted her research in the winter and spring of 1979 and submitted her report to the Council in June of that year. The Council referred the report first to an ad hoc committee composed of interested Canadian scholars, and then to the Committee on International Relations, a joint policy committee of the SSHRC and its Advisory Academic Panel.

The Council has found the report most useful in deciding on the future of the exchanges with the USSR, and would like to express its appreciation to Dr. Ghent for her part in this program review.

André Fortier
President
Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council

April 1980

PREFACE

From 1972 to September 1979, under the 1(C)1, 1(D)1 1(D)2 and 1(D)5 clauses of the General Exchanges Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)*, Canada and the Soviet Union exchanged 126 professors and specialists, and 127 graduate students or postdoctoral scholars.[1] Upon inheriting the administrative responsibility for these programs from the Canada Council in 1978, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) also inherited a poorly organized filing system. There was no cumulation of even the most basic statistics on the number of scholars exchanged, or the number of refusals and rejections. Files on pre-1975 "unsuccessful" candidates were destroyed, making it difficult to determine how many Canadians in the earlier years of the agreement had not been accepted by the Soviet Union, and why. Dossiers on other candidates were missing or incomplete; policy files lacked essential data on the development of programs and procedures. Nowhere did there exist a compendium of Canadian host or candidate experience with the exchange, making it hard to gauge scholarly interest or evaluate the program's academic benefits.

Drawing on Department of External Affairs material and interview sources in addition to files of the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) and those of the Canada Council/SSHRC, this study attempts to remedy the neglect. Besides providing the missing quantitative data, the report - in line with its terms of reference - reviews the activities under the Canada/USSR agreement with particular attention to the evolution and direction of academic interest in the exchange. It examines the main problems encountered by Canadian scholars in the USSR as well as by those Canadians who have acted as hosts. The report also compares and assesses the effectiveness and scholarly value of the different clauses, and offers recommendations, where appropriate, to improve the operation of the program. It is a draft study intended for use as a working paper - as a basis for discussion among interested scholars and policy-makers.

Jocelyn Maynard Ghent
June 1979

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*See Appendix 1, page 78.

[1]These figures include Canadians currently in the USSR, two who have not yet departed, and four Soviets who were scheduled to arrive later in 1979.

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I ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATION

One of the first expressions of a thaw in the cold war, beginning in the fall and winter of 1955-56, was reawakened Russian interest in educational exchanges with the West. In 1959, the Soviet Academy of Sciences signed an agreement with the National Research Council of Canada (NRC) providing for the exchange of professors in various fields of pure and applied science. Under NRC, International Atomic Energy Agency and UNESCO fellowships, younger Soviet scientists also began to study in Canada. The first award to a Soviet national of a Canada Council (Non-Resident) Fellowship was given in 1960. The recipient, a social scientist, spent the 1960-61 academic year at the University of Toronto.

The next significant event in the development of academic relations between the two countries occurred in 1963. Through an exchange of letters with the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education (MINVUZ), the newly-formed Centre for Russian and East European Studies (CREES) at the University of Toronto undertook an exchange. From 1963-1971, the CREES/MINVUZ arrangement functioned as a national program. Thirty Canadian students, altogether, spent an academic year at Moscow State University, although seven had no connection with the University of Toronto at all. Another eight had received their first degrees from Toronto, but at the time of their study in the USSR, they were in graduate school at Cornell, California, Indiana, Columbia, Chicago, Wisconsin and elsewhere. Over one-third of the Canadians were in the area of Russian literature, and only two were in a science field. Toronto hosted, in return, 31 Soviet scholars who were mostly scientists and engineers. In 1969-70, a faculty exchange program was also negotiated, but this was not as successful as the graduate exchange since "on a number of occasions, the Soviets turned down our nominees."[2]

Under the aegis of the World University Service, the University of British Columbia began sending students to the Soviet Union in 1962-63, as did McGill in 1965-66. In the latter year, the University of Alberta started its own program with Kiev University in the Ukraine. Between 1961 and 1966, under a Canada Council exchange of Young Artists, three Canadian dancers went to the USSR to study ballet. Carleton signed an exchange agreement with Leningrad University in 1968. The proliferation of activity through the mid-1960s meant a heavy burden for the Canadian Embassy in Moscow, and a considerable duplication of effort in negotiations with Soviet authorities. Moreover, students and professors whose interests could not be accommodated by one of the university exchanges were compelled

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[2]Information received from Professor Gordon Skilling, University of Toronto, 11 May 1979.

to make individual, expensive arrangements through Intourist. They were generally allowed only very short stays and almost invariably there were appeals to the embassy for help in getting visas extended, or assistance in securing access to Soviet libraries and archives. In response to Canadian complaints about the poor treatment of scholars, the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education usually pointed to the fact that the USSR had no intergovernmental framework agreement with Canada as it did with the United States and other Western countries. Such agreements, MINVUZ observed, were useful in ameliorating many of the problems being posed by Canada's piecemeal approach.

The idea of an intergovernmental agreement had long been under consideration by officials in Ottawa. The range and volume of Canadian and Soviet contacts in all areas - scientific, industrial, cultural and educational - had expanded so rapidly that policy-makers felt the need for some sort of mechanism to improve coordination and control. Ad hoc exchanges seemed to be working primarily to the benefit of the highly centralized Soviets. In the academic area alone, the advantages of an intergovernmental agreement appeared substantial. The authority of a high-level mixed commission or joint committee, which would meet regularly to review and assess the agreement, would give Canada a more solid basis for negotiating material and academic concessions for scholars. By coordinating the Canadian effort, uniform standards of selection could be established. A national approach would offer a wider choice to scholars, instead of confining them to the Soviet institution with which their university was paired. The placement of Soviet scholars would be simplified. Canada would be able to bargain from a position of strength, and a more equitable exchange would be ensured.

After Cabinet's 1966 approval of a recommendation to proceed with the agreement, planning began in earnest. The original scheme for the organization of academic exchanges under the proposed framework envisaged a two-tier committee structure. The first, an Interdepartmental Committee on Academic Exchanges with the USSR, would be made up of the interested divisions within External Affairs, the National Research Council, the Canada Council, and one private organization - the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada. This body would formulate and recommend policy to an inter-university committee, made up of academic representatives from those institutions with well-developed programs in Soviet Studies. Functioning as a subcommittee of the AUCC, this group would have the primary responsibility for determining policy and, through a national secretariat, for implementing the exchange. Modelled on the British and American schemes, the plan would ensure the autonomy of what was essentially an academic program. Moreover, the effective instrument was already in place. An Inter-University Committee (I-UC) had been formed in 1965 to promote exchanges, and to provide informal liaison

between Toronto, Carleton, UBC, McGill, Montréal and other interested universities. The Canada Council, which had started to help finance the University of Toronto exchange, and which would probably lend some modest support to the new arrangement, would assume an advisory role in matters of selection and administration.

The negotiation of the Canadian/Soviet accord was interrupted by the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and further delayed by a change of government in Ottawa. When the agreement was finally implemented in 1972, the initial organizational scheme had been entirely reversed. The Canada Council now played the central role, and the academic body was assigned an advisory function. The key decisions appear to have been taken by the Pearson government, at least partly on the basis of a Canada Council offer to assume a major portion of the financial burden. Although many officials thought the AUCC/I-UC subcommittee was the organization with the competence to select and place candidates, the idea somehow prevailed that the primary funding agency should also be the primary administrative agency. Ironically, after the agreement had finally been signed, External Affairs took on the funding and the Canada Council retained only the administrative function. The Council did subsequently assume the costs of its own exchange program with the Soviet Academy of Sciences, but External Affairs has always paid for the exchanges of professors and students under clauses 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 of the eventual agreement. The whole issue of a policy role for the funding organization did, in any case, ignore the substantial contribution the universities would be expected to make in receiving Soviet students and professors to their campuses.

Administration by the Canada Council had envisioned close and continuous liaison with the university community. The program, "because of the difficulties inherent in cooperation with the Soviet Union, was supposed to be monitored by an advisory panel . . . The I-UC, however, had virtually no budget and never played a large role in policy-making."[3] In fact, the only residuum of the initial scheme is the AUCC's present role in the operation of the program for Canadian students. This role appears to have been the result of a compromise designed to allay academic misgivings about the degree of government control. Originally, the compromise had focused on the Canada Council as the administering body for the professorial exchange, and the AUCC as the organization responsible for the selection of Canadian students and the placement of Soviet nominees.

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[3]David W. Steedman, "Canadian Cultural and Academic Relations Abroad: A Commentary on Exchange Programs and Canadian Studies" (unpublished paper, prepared when Steedman was Academic Director of the Humanities Research Council of Canada).

By the time the agreement had been signed, the operation of the professorial exchange was still with the Canada Council but, inexplicably, the administration of the student exchange had been split between the Council and the AUCC. Clause 1(D)2, providing for the exchange of junior scholars, was to be administered on the Canadian side by two different agencies - the Canada Council for incoming Soviet students, and the AUCC for the outgoing Canadians. The section in this report on clause 1(D)2 discusses the ways in which this arrangement has worked to Canadian disadvantage.

The potential for academic influence on policy in the early years of the agreement was further undermined by some confusion on the question of who actually represented the university community. the AUCC was the representative body of Canadian universities, as institutions, but the I-UC seemed more closely to represent the interested community of individual scholars. In recognition of this, External Affairs looked separately to each body for expert advice, as well as to individual academics who might represent their institutions at meetings of the Mixed Commission.[4] There was no unified academic voice. The AUCC/I-UC subcommittee idea had never come to fruition, and the two organizations were not closely linked.[5] The initial absence of a bond between the AUCC and the I-UC, combined with events surrounding the Dotsenko defection,[6] also meant that program administrators did not draw extensively as originally planned on CREES' nine-year experience in running the Toronto student exchange.

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[4]The Mixed Commission is the formal forum, under the General Exchanges Agreement, at which representatives of both parties to the Agreement evaluate the effectiveness of the exchange program. It meets every two years.

[5]A closer association was negotiated in 1976 and in 1977 the I-UC received associate member status from the AUCC.

[6]Boris Dotsenko, a participant in the Alberta-Kiev exchange, defected in 1971 - thereby ending not only the Alberta program but also the exchange with Toronto. Soviet authorities suspended the latter because Dotsenko found employment as a research assistant to a University of Toronto Professor of Mathematics. Subsequently, the Soviets refused to recognize their long-standing relationship with Toronto by sanctioning a special Toronto-Moscow arrangement to be incorporated - like the Carleton-Leningrad exchange - as one clause of the new agreement. The Soviet-Toronto relationship was never revived, and except in the first year of the agreement, Toronto students were accorded no special status.

While the AUCC operated their part of the agreement in a generally more efficient and well-organized fashion than did the Canada Council, the absence of a strong academic role in the development of procedures seems apparent. The selection process, for example, differed from that employed by the University of Toronto. Candidates for the CREES exchange were selected solely on the grounds of academic merit. The AUCC uses a two-level committee structure. Candidates are short-listed on the basis of their academic qualifications and ability to carry out the proposed research. A second committee, usually made up of one professor and two officials from External Affairs, makes the final selection after interviewing the candidates. At this stage, nonacademic criteria may be counted. According to one professor who has been involved in the process, interviewers also "will be looking for . . . the candidate's representativity as a Canadian."[7] In one case this meant that an exceptionally well-qualified candidate - a Canadian historian with a BA from Hebrew University in Jerusalem working on a PhD at Columbia - was turned down two years in a row. Since he had never attended a Canadian institution, the committee felt he would make a poor representative of Canadian universities in the Soviet setting.

The organization of exchanges under the agreement has been characterized not only by a lack of academic input into policy but by a surfeit of bureaucratic actors. Responsibility for the academic side of the intergovernmental agreement is diffused not only among National Research Council/NSERC,[8] Canada Council/SSHRC and the AUCC, but also three bureaus in External Affairs - the Eastern Europe division, the Visits Panel, and the Academic Relations section of Cultural Affairs - in addition to the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. The Visits Panel, which was organized in 1956 to supervise and coordinate all official exchanges with communist countries, has had five different Secretaries since 1972. Foreign service officers are subject to rotation, and short institutional memory has been an ongoing problem. The next section of this report deals with some of the difficulties posed by the inefficiency of the Soviet bureaucracy, but it is clear that the Canadian bureaucracy also has its cumbersome aspects, and that the exchange has sometimes suffered from inadequte interagency coordination.

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[7]John Greer Nicholson, "Canadian-Soviet Academic Exchanges," Paper delivered before meetings of the Canadian Association of Slavists, May 1978.

[8]NSERC is the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, the agency now responsible for administering the NRC agreement with the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

II DELAYS, QUOTAS, REJECTION RATES, AND THE FAILURE OF CLAUSE 1(D)5[9]

Delays

The General Exchanges Agreement was signed by Premier Kosygin and Prime Minister Trudeau on October 20, 1971. Since then a Mixed Commission has met every two years, alternately in Ottawa and Moscow, for the purpose of reviewing the academic, cultural and scientific programs of exchange. At Mixed Commission meetings, representatives from both sides negotiate changes and additions to the new exchanges and agree upon a new two-year program. The academic program for 1978-79 is the fourth to be concluded since signature of the agreement. A comparison with the three predecessor programs shows a number of alterations over the years in the provisions governing the exchange of both junior and senior scholars. Quotas have varied. Stipends have been raised. Other changes reflect the effort to solve recurring problems. Beginning with the 1974-75 program, for instance, the agreement set forth a new responsibility for the host party - arranging for participants to be met upon arrival "and to be given whatever assistance they may require for accommodation or further travel in transit to their destination." The most significant modifications, however, regularly centre on attempts to rectify the persistent, seemingly intractable problem of Soviet delays - delays in the receipt of nominations; delays in the announcement of placement; delays in Soviet arrivals; delays in the issuance of visas; delays in permission to use Soviet archives.

Delays were also a major difficulty for administrators of Toronto's exchange in the 1960s. The university often received the names of the Soviet nominees very late (e.g. 3 September 1964 for the 1964-65 academic year), and while Canadian nominations were usually submitted in the spring, the university generally had to wait several months before receiving notice of a Soviet decision. According to an early report, these problems imposed

> a great personal strain on those in charge of the program at Toronto and on the students concerned who were usually uncertain until late summer or early fall as to whether they were going to get to the USSR or not. Substantial additional expenses were involved, too, resulting from cable and telephone communications . . . . This year we tried to enforce an earlier settlement by warning that the exchange would have to be terminated if no decisions were received on our candidates by various dates, all of which came and went. The

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[9]See Appendix 1 for an outline of the relevant clauses of the 1977-78 program of exchanges.

> carrying through of such threats is extremely difficult, as it involves disappointing the legitimate expectations of students who have been selected and who have no alternative plans for the year, and, of course, cancels all the values derived from the exchange.[10]

This description of Toronto's difficulty, and of an attempted solution, will not be unfamiliar to those at External Affairs, the AUCC, and Canada Council/SSHRC who have been involved in the administration of the General Exchanges Agreement. Officials hoped that the procedures for selection and approval of candidates would be improved by the existence of an intergovernmental accord. Within the relevant clauses, and in the Annex to the Agreement, there are stipulations pertaining to the date for receipt of a candidate's nomination and subsequent acceptance or rejection, and for the timing of an annual joint placement meeting to reach final agreement. There are also stipulations regarding the information requirements for nominee data sheets, and for notification of placement. Yet despite an explicit definition of principles, delays continued to plague participants. Canadian experience with the initial year of the agreement was most trying. One professor waited six months for his visa. The late spring timing of the first Mixed Commission meeting postponed the placement of Soviet students until August 1972, but none of them arrived until mid-winter, and decisions on the Canadian students were not received until October and (in two cases) January. Relative to that initial year, Soviet performance improved, but delays of up to a month or more remained the rule rather than the exception. For example, the 1974-75 program provided for the receipt of nominations by March 15. Canada was four days late in submitting the names of its candidates for both the 1(D)1 senior and 1(D)2 junior exchange in 1974. The Soviets were weeks late, submitting the names of their young researchers on April 5 and the names of the senior scholars on April 22. Once placed, the six Soviet professors in the latter category were scheduled to arrive in the fall. Only one came on time. Another, whose arrival was promised for September 26, October 21 and then November 27, eventually cancelled. A third, whose arrival was also postponed on the same three occasions, finally landed in Montreal on January 2. Since reservations were made for apartments on the basis of the intial dates, the Canada Council incurred unnecessary expense and hosts were seriously inconvenienced. The

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[10]Report prepared by the Director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, H. Gordon Skilling, 1 November 1965. (Copy provided by Professor Skilling)

frustations, overall, prompted one External Affairs officer to set down the following limerick:

> The Response to proposals to date?
> From the Russians: too little, too late!
> We should therefore imply
> If they don't soon comply
> with the Programme, we'll reciprocate.

Canadian officials still have difficulty persuading the Soviet side that the question of delay is not merely an unimportant administrative detail, but an issue basic to the conduct of the exchanges.

In the administration of their counterpart program, the Americans encounter similar frustration. Part of the problem is cultural. It is difficult for westerners to understand or deal with the sheer inertia and ponderous weight of the Soviet bureaucracy. Canadians who have hosted Soviet scholars repeatedly express their amazement at the visitors' capacity for coping with red tape. Conversely, North American habits - "particularly our interest in efficiency, neatness and dispatch" - create difficulties for Soviet officials.[11] A greater part of the problem lies in the weakness of MINVUZ, the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education. MINVUZ operates the Soviet side of both the 1(D)1 exchange of professors and the 1(D)2 exchange of students. It is the Soviet body responsible for the administration of all foreign exchanges with Soviet universities, but it appears to have little or no influence with other arms of the Soviet bureaucracy. Thus a visa may be delayed because MINVUZ cannot get agreement from the issuing agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. MINVUZ may promise access to particular archives or institutes but not be able to act on such assurances because administration of the latter falls under another authority. MINVUZ may even have difficulty at times securing the cooperation of, or obtaining information from, other offices within its own jurisdiction - for example, the foreign department of a Soviet university.

In growing recognition of MINVUZ's problems with the Soviet hierarchy, Canadian officials initiated important changes in the program for 1976-77. To lessen the impact of the inevitable delays, the date for presentation of the list of each country's nominees was pushed back from March 15 to February 20. Even if the Soviets were several weeks late, this would still allow placement of their candidates before the beginning of the academic vacation period in Canada. The earlier date would also mean an earlier decision for

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[11] R.F. Byrnes, Soviet-American Academic Exchanges 1958-1975 (Bloomington, Indiana, 1976), p. 155.

Canadian nominees - presumably by late April or early May at the joint placement meeting scheduled to take place two months after submission of the lists. The 1976-77 program also specified, for the first time, that notification of rejection or acceptance by the host country would have to be given in writing. The notification of acceptance would have to state the institution at which the candidate had been placed, the date upon which the candidate was expected to arrive, the archives to which the candidate had been granted access, and assurance "that appropriate steps will be taken for granting a visa to a candidate before his agreed date of arrival." These provisions would hopefully prevent MINVUZ from continuing to employ a favoured stalling tactic: agreement "in principle" to the various terms of a placement, with a subsequent last-minute backing-off when verbal promises could not be carried out. Insistence on written notification did improve the situation to some extent, but administrators now cope with ambiguous language, poor translations, and evasiveness. In the last category, for instance, the Soviets may state that access has been granted to four collections at archives or libraries, but neglect to say anything at all about a fifth collection which has also been requested. And throughout the term of the 1976-77 program, there were still the annoying and sometimes costly delays in nomination and placement of candidates, issuance of visas, and in the arrivals of Soviet scholars.[12]

Besides the earlier date for nomination of candidates, and the provision for written notification of acceptance or rejection, Canadians gained two other important concessions in negotiating the 1976-77 program. The stipend was raised from 150 to 180 rubles ($200 to $240) per month for students, and from nine to 12 rubles per day for professors. In addition, on the initiative of Dalhousie University, a new clause was accepted by the Soviets providing for intensive Russian language study for up to 10 (and later 12) Canadians over four-month terms at the Pushkin Institute in Moscow. All of these modifications appear to have been made at the cost of raising the student quota. Although there was some feeling on the Canadian side that a reduction might be in order, the number of places for students under clause 1(D)2 increased from 12 to 15. At the next Mixed Commission meeting, in January 1978, officials were able to revise the numbers downwards, but only after compromising on other clauses.

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[12]A case in the latter category was a mechanical engineer who was expected to start a two-month term at a western university in September 1977. Short-term accommodation in the host city is very scarce, and rents are very high. The Canada Council reserved an apartment for him at a rate of $450 per month starting September 1. He did not arrive until October 3.

Quotas and Rejection Rates: 1(D)2

Table 1

Exchange of Graduate Students and Young Postdoctoral Scholars

Year	No. of Canadian applications	Quota	Available places	AUCC Nominees	CC artists	Withdrawals	Refusals	No. of Canadian 1(D)2s
1972-73	53	12	8	6	0	0	0	6
1973-74	31	12	8	8	0	1	0	7
1974-75	41	12	10	9	2	1	2	8
1975-76	34	12	10	10	1	0	2	9
1976-77	34	15	13	12	0	1	0	11
1977-78	19	15	13	10	2	0	1	11
1978-79	24	10	10	8	0	0	1	7
1979-80	32	10	10	9	0	-	-	-
Total								59

During the first four years under the agreement, clause 1(D)2 provided for the exchange of "annually up to 12 students and young postdoctoral scholars." In the initial program, the quota encompassed two places for medical exchange students, two for students on the Carleton-Leningrad exchange, two for Canada Council young artists, and six for AUCC nominees. In the second program, the number of places available for AUCC nominees increased by two, because the medical exchange idea was dropped. In the second and third programs, there remains a differential of two between the specified quota and the number of places available for government-sponsored candidates because until 1978-79, places for the two Carleton students continued to fall under the quota. The failure to nominate less than the full quota in 1972-73, 1976-77 and 1978-79 reflected the Canada Council's inability to fill the two places reserved for young artists. The AUCC might have nominated academic replacements, but was not informed in time to make the selections.

Officials sought to lower the quota for the fourth, 1978-79, program because of reduced student interest in the exchange. Although that interest is now climbing back to mid-decade levels, Table 1 shows that the number of applications dropped sharply in 1977. The reason for the decline may have been related in part to the post-Helsinki strains in East-West relations which were developing in this period. Potential students could have been discouraged, too, by the reports of access difficulties (and other problems which are discussed elsewhere in this report). According to the AUCC, however,

the most important factor was probably the rejection of four Canadian candidates between 1974 and 1976. A biologist from a Prairie university who wanted to study boreal ecology at Moscow and in Irkutsk, and a doctoral candidate at a west-coast institution who wished to investigate Soviet urban government were the two students refused in 1974-75. The following year, two more were rejected. The latter two were Canadians of Ukrainian descent pursuing doctoral studies under Canada Council fellowships in history and political science. At the joint placement meeting in May 1975 MINVUZ stated that both had been accepted by the University of Kiev, but in July the acceptances were abruptly withdrawn. While Soviet officials admitted that Kiev had reneged on its original agreement, they insisted that Ukrainian authorities had considerable autonomy on questions of education, and could not be compelled to accept the two students. Unsuccessful efforts to place them at Moscow or at Leningrad instead delayed the final refusal until October. This long period of uncertainty provoked a formal note of protest from Ottawa, a note which acknowledged each country's right to reject a candidate, but insisted that decisions be taken in time to prevent hardship to a student and to permit the selection and placement of an alternate.

Over all the years of the agreement, however, the USSR has rejected only six students - less than 10% of the total number of Canadian 1(D)2 nominations. As Table 2 shows, moreover, this rate of refusal has been reciprocal. Canadians have turned down at least nine Soviet 1(D)2 applicants since the beginning of the exchange.

Table 2

Exchange of Graduate Students and Young Postdoctoral Scholars

Year	Soviet nominations	Refusals	Withdrawals	No. of Soviet 1(D)2s
1972-73	11	1	5	5
1973-74	> 7	*	*	7
1974-75	> 8	*	*	8
1975-76	15	2	1	12
1976-77	17	3	2	12
1977-78	16	0	2	14
1978-79	>13	3	3	7
Totals	87	> 9	> 13	65

*Unknown; files destroyed. See footnote 13.

The Soviet withdrawal rate is considerably higher - 15% compared with less than 5% in the Canadian case - but the rejection rate is approximately the same. In addition, there has been no significant numerical imbalance. Sixty-five Soviet 1(D)2 scholars spent 636 man-months in Canada, compared with 59 Canadians who studied for a total of 572 man-months in the USSR.

Quotas and Rejection Rates: 1(D)1

The 1(D)1 exchange of professors and specialists, on the other hand, suffers from both significant numerical imbalance and a highly asymmetrical rejection rate. As Table 3 shows, neither the Canadian nor the Soviet side has ever been able to use the full 1(D)1 quota of man-months, but until the doubling of the quota in 1976, both sides had exchanged an equal number of candidates.

Table 3

1(D)1 Exchange of Professors and Specialists

	Canadians		Soviets		
Year	No. of candidates	No. of months	No. of candidates	No. of months	Quota
1972-73	2	8	2	8	In any field of study, Up to 5 professors for terms of up to 5 months in each case
1973-74	3	8	3	12	
1974-75	6	12	6	14	Up to 5 professors for periods of 3-5 months up to a total of 20 man-months
1975-76	5	4½	5	13	
1976-77	0	0	10	29	Up to 10 professors for periods of 1-5 months up to a total of 40 man-months.
1977-78	6	9	10	33	
1978-79	2	2	2	9	
Totals	24	43½	38	118	

At first glance, one might suppose that the doubled quota was a Soviet initiative, agreed to - like the increase in the number of 1(D)2 students - at the third meeting of the Mixed Commission, in order to gain other advantages in the program for 1976-77. However, the doubling of the quota for 1976 and subsequent years was actually a Canada Council initiative. The rationale was the simultaneous elimination of another troublesome clause. The first program, for 1972-73, had provided for the exchange of up to three specialists in language, literature and linguistics, and up to two professors in science, social science or the humanities "for teaching and delivering

lectures" for terms of from one semester to a full academic year. In the 1974-75 program, these two clauses were combined for a total of five professors to teach or deliver lectures in any field. But Canadian scholars were interested in doing research, not teaching in the USSR and the nominations of four Soviet professors (one in law and three in language/linguistics) in 1975-76 had resulted - after much administrative work - in one nonplacement and three withdrawals.[13] Instead of simply trying to negotiate removal of the unworkable clause, the Canada Council advised merging the 1974-75 quota of five lecturers with the 1974-75 quota of five researchers in a new 1(D)1 provision for the exchange of up to 10 professors who would pursue research or, "on the invitation of the receiving side . . . deliver separate lectures and reports."

It was hoped that this more flexible approach, which also reduced the minimum stay from three months to one month, would attract a larger number of applicants and ensure a full slate of Canadian candidates. Yet ironically, in the first year of the doubled quota, Canada was not able to send a single 1(D)1 scholar to the Soviet Union. Out of 17 applications received by the Canada Council for the 1976-77 academic year, three were turned down by the selection committee, nine were nominated for the Canada Council/Academy of Science exchange, and five were nominated under 1(D)1. Four of these were then refused by the Soviets, and the remaining nominee withdrew. Since then, as Table 3 shows, clause 1(D)1 has continued to serve Soviet interests more clearly than Canadian. A tally of the figures shows, overall, that 61% of 1(D) 1 participants have been from the USSR and that the Soviets have spent more than 2½ times the Canadian allotment of man-months. In recognition of this, Canadian officials sought to reduce the quota, at the 1978 meeting of the Mixed Commission, from 10 professors and specialists for up to 40 man-months to seven for up to 30. However, the Soviet side had already agreed to a substantive reduction in the number of students. They refused to go along with another reduction and clause 1(D)1 was left intact, except for agreement that the exchange should be conducted "on a reciprocal basis."

The latter phrase permitted the SSHRC to insist on a policy of "strict reciprocity" in 1978-79. Until 1976, the 1(D)1 program had operated on a roughly equivalent basis, with the Russians securing the

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[13]Information is not available for the earlier years because the files for all pre-1975 "unsuccessful" candidates - whether Canadians designated as alternates, or rejected by the selection committee; or Canadians and Soviets nominated but withdrawn, or nominated but not accepted by the host country - have been destroyed. The files for 1975-76 were saved by the alert action of a records clerk who happened to notice them in a basement storage area.

edge in number of man-months. The exchange in the next two years, following the doubling of the quota, undermined the principle of reciprocity. The four refusals in 1976-77 were followed by four more in 1977-78, although the Canada Council accepted all Soviet candidates in that period. Overall, as Table 4 shows, the Soviets have rejected at least 13, or almost 32% of all Canadian nominations under clause 1(D)1 of the General Exchanges Agreement. According to available data, before implementation of "strict reciprocity" in 1978-79, Canadian officials had refused only one out of 40 Soviet nominations - a rejection rate of less than 3%. This year's nonplacement of seven Soviet candidates brings Canada's overall refusal rate of 1(D)1 nominees to 16.3%, a figure that is still only half as large as its Soviet counterpart.

Table 4

1(D)1 Exchange of Professors and Specialists

	Canadians				Soviets			
Year	Nomin-ations	Re-fusals	With-drawals	Partic-ipants	Nomin-ations	Re-fusals	With drawals	Partic-ipants
1972-73	> 2	*	*	2	> 2	*	*	2
1973-74	> 7	2	2	3	> 3	*	*	3
1974-75	> 6	*	*	6	> 6	*	*	6
1975-76	6	1	0	5	7	1	1	5
1976-77	5	4	1	0	11	0	1	10
1977-78	11**	4	0	6	11	0	1	10
1978-79	4	2	0	2	9	7	0	2
Totals	> 41	> 13	> 3	24	> 49	> 8	> 3	38

*Unknown; files destroyed.
**One candidate was held over to 1978-79.

The 1(D)1 refusals clearly show MINVUZ's weakness within the Soviet bureaucracy, for most of the cases reflect the Ministry's inability to get an agreement on placement from other Soviet departments. One of the four rejected candidates in 1976-77 was in the field of music education. His request for five months of research at the University of Moscow's Musicological Institute was disallowed by the Ministry of Culture. The latter ministry was also responsible for the refusal of two Canadian artists who had been training in eastern Europe and now sought study at the Moscow State School of Circus and Variety Art. The Canadian applications were not accepted

in 1976-77, and again in 1977-78, on the grounds that "probation" in the Circus School demanded "some special training" in its methods and programs (although the artistically concerned School officials had been very sympathetic to the Canadian proposal). The fourth Canadian candidate to be turned down in 1976-77 was also refused twice. In 1975-76 and again in the following year, MINVUZ stated that their officials had been unable to persuade the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture to accept the project of a professor from the University of Winnipeg. Supervision of the Canadian study, which involved agricultural research in the Ukraine, was also refused by the Universities of Kiev and Novosibirsk. Despite a growing number of remonstrations from officials at the embassy in Moscow, and repeated stress on Canada's disenchantment with the operation of clause 1(D)1, in 1977-78 MINVUZ failed to place two more candidates, in addition to the second rejections of the two artists. The new refusals were both made on the grounds that the applicants' study themes were "not developed in Soviet higher institutions." The two projects were in the fields of history, and one - a proposed examination of the role of the imperial army in mid-eighteenth century Russian society - was regarded by referees as a study of outstanding potential.

Eight 1(D)1 rejections in two years, combined with delays and other difficulties in 1977-78, were among the factors leading Canadian officials to insist on the policy of "strict reciprocity" for 1978-79. Heightened political tensions also played a role. A few Canadian hosts refused to accept Soviet candidates on moral grounds, as a personal protest aginst the trials of Soviet dissidents. In February 1978, Soviet Embassy personnel were expelled for espionage. During this period, the shift of responsibility from the Canada Council to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council was also going on. As a result of the transititon, the usual Joint Placement Meeting for 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 candidates did not take place in the spring of 1978. Instead, through External Affairs, the SSHRC informed MINVUZ that although the USSR had nominated nine 1(D)1 scholars, only four would be accepted because the Council had been able to find only four Canadian nominees. In the fall of 1978, the Soviets were notified that only two of their 1(D)1 scholars could now be accepted because the deadline had passed and MINVUZ had not yet accepted two of the four Canadian candidates. The policy was also applied to the 1(D)2 exchange. Since Canada had received final word on the acceptance of seven of the eight students nominated by the AUCC, seven out of the 10 Soviet 1(D)2 nominees were accepted. Visas for all the other Soviet 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 candidates were not issued, and the exchanges had been cancelled.

The Soviets believe they are being penalized, unfairly, for the Council's inability to attract more than four Canadian professors to the 1(D)1 program. Hence they felt justified in complaining that Canada's interpretation of reciprocity is not equitable, or in

accordance with the intent of the agreement. Council officials have argued, on the other hand, that for a number of reasons 1978-79 was an exceptional year, and that Canada may come closer in future to filling the quota. Indeed, as Table 5 shows, Canadian academic interest in a senior scholars exchange with the USSR has remained fairly constant. Although there actually were fewer applications for 1978-79 than for other years, the smaller number of candidates nominated under 1(D)1 really reflects the proportionate increase in the number of candidates nominated under the Council/Academy exchange. The figures for 1(D)1 and 1(C)1 in 1978-79 are almost the mirror image of those for 1977-78.

Table 5

Year	No. of Canadian applications	Assignments 1(C)1	1(D)1	1(D)5	Total no. of Canadian nominations
1972-74	*	-	-	-	-
1975-76	16	3	6	4	13
1976-77	17	9	5	-	14
1977-78	18	3	11	3	17
1978-79	15	11	4	-	15
1979-80	20**	7	10	-	17

*Unknown; files destroyed.

**This figure excludes three candidates seeking two-week excursions to the Khabarovsk Congress, and one applicant who was transferred to the 1(D)2 junior exchange. The jump from 15 to 20 may reflect the new administration's effort to assess academic interest in the exchange. For the first time, applications were invited directly for 1(C)1, instead of being culled indirectly from the holders of other Council awards and applicants for 1(D)1. The total number of nominations for 1979-80 does not include the two candidates who were designated as alternates.

Quotas and Rejection Rates: 1(C)1

If a Canadian scholar wishes to work at a Soviet university, or at a library or other institution under MINVUZ or another Ministry's jurisdiction for a period of one to five months, then he or she must be nominated under 1(D)1. If the scholar wishes to work in an archives or research institute affiliated with the Academy of Sciences for a period of weeks or months, then the candidacy is placed under 1(C)1. If a scholar seeks access to a number of institutions under both MINVUZ and Academy authority, then the Council's selection committee may exercise some discretion. On the committee's judgment, a candidate may be assigned to either the MINVUZ or the Academy exchange, with efforts made to ensure access to places not under

respective jurisdictions. Over the years, it has proved easier for the Academy of Sciences to gain entry to institutions under MINVUZ control than for MINVUZ to perform the opposite function. The Academy of Sciences enjoys a much more prestigious position in the Soviet hierarchy than does the Minister of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education. Thus where there is leeway, and especially when the candidate is a senior scholar with an established reputation, selection committees have tended to recommend nomination under the 1(C)1 Academy of Sciences exchange.

Since there were no Canadian 1(D)1 candidates in 1976-77, the nomination of 11 for 1977-78 and of only three under the Council/Academy agreement appears to reflect a Canada Council effort to restore some numerical balance to the 1(D)1 exchange. Additional difficulties with 1(D)1 in 1977-78, and a slate of strong candidates seemingly worthy of more than MINVUZ attention, led the Council to reverse the figures for 1978-79. The wisdom of this choice is indicated in part by a comparison of the number of Soviet refusals of 1(D)1 and 1(C)1 candidates. Since 1974, MINVUZ has turned down eight Canadian professors or specialists and three of these were rejected twice. In the same period, the Academy of Sciences has refused only one out of 31 Canadian nominees.

Table 6

1(C)1 Council/Academy Exchange of Professors

Year	Nominations	Withdrawals	Refusals	No. of participants	Man-months
Canadian					
1974-75	6	1	0	5	9
1975-76	3	0	0	3	2½
1976-77	9	0	1	8	17½
1977-78	2	0	0	2	6
1978-79*	11	1	0	10	20½
Total 1974-78				18	35
Total 1974-79*				28	55½
Soviet					
1974-75	2	0	0	2	8
1975-76	5	0	0	2	5
1976-77	6	1	0	5	7½
1977-78	14	1	0	13	20½
1978-79*	12	3	0	9	10½
Total 1974-78				25	41
Total 1974-79*				34	51½

*Projected

The 1(C)1 quota, which has not varied since the inception of the agreement, provides for the exchange of up to 10 professors to conduct research in the social sciences or the humanities for periods of up to an overall total of 20 man-months. As Table 6 shows, the Canadian side will be using the full quota in 1979, for the first time, if all candidates depart as scheduled. In 1977-78, the Soviet side exceeded the quota in persons as a result of special circumstances. Carleton University held an international Conference on Social Psychology, and clause 1(C)1 was used to accommodate several Soviet participants. Of 39 Soviet nominations through all the years of the exchange, three were repeat applications from scholars seeking a second trip to Canada: one came in 1974-75 and 1977-78; another undertook an extensive tour of Canadian universities and other establishments in 1974-75 and 1978-79; and a third is expected to return to Canada in 1979 after an initial tour in 1976-77. There are also repeat applications on the Canadian side. Three members of the 1978-79 group were returning to the USSR on their second 1(C)1 exchange (as are two applicants for the 1979-80 program). Table 6 indicates substantial numerical differences in any given year, but overall, the Council/Academy exchange is being carried out on an approximately reciprocal basis.

The Failure of Clause 1(D)5

In 1974, when the Canada Council/Academy of Sciences agreement was being negotiated for inclusion as clause 1(C)1 in the second program of exchanges under the General Agreement, it appeared that scholarly demands would soon be satisfied in all areas except one. Professors in the social sciences or humanities would now be able to carry out research for periods of weeks or months through a direct link with the Soviet Academy - a counterpart to the 1959 National Research Council/Academy accord on scientific exchange. Canadian professors in all fields could also carry out research for periods as long as five months in Soviet universities through the 1(D)1 exchange administered by MINVUZ. Canadian graduate students and young postdoctoral scholars could spend an entire academic year at Soviet universities under clause 1(D)2. There was no provision, however, for professors or junior scholars who wished to carry out short-term research at university facilities in the USSR. To fill this perceived need, the Canada Council secured Soviet agreement to a new clause, permitting the placement of up to seven scholars for periods of up to six weeks. The clause was <u>not</u> reciprocal, and the Canadian side would bear all expenses for travel and maintenance costs. Drafted as 1(D)6 in the 1974-75 program, and as 1(D)5 in subsequent programs, it was intended to serve a unique Canadian need for short-term research.

In the first year, 1(D)5 was used by one Canadian, a student of Lithuanian descent who was working on a doctoral thesis on the topic of late nineteenth century Lithúanian emigration. In 1975-76, there

were four nominations. One student from a Québec university who wanted to do research in French literature at Tartu was refused by MINVUZ. Another student who was pursuing a doctorate in pre-1500 Jewish Studies was accepted, but he encountered numerous problems in trying to carry out his program. Two professors, a slavic specialist from Ontario and a west-coast specialist in education, also went to the USSR under clause 1(D)5. Both reported profitable stays. Dealing with MINVUZ in the administration of the clause was extremely difficult, however, for both the Canadian Embassy and the Council. A nonreciprocal clause leaves little room for bargaining. Placements were granted and visas were issued only after extraordinary efforts on the candidates' behalf.

Changes in 1(D)1, negotiated in the 1976-77 program, undercut the rationale for 1(D)5. The minimum stay was reduced to one month and the quota was doubled. Since almost all applicants for short-term research were requesting four to six week stays, the need for 1(D)5 was now considerably less. Indeed, there were no applicants at all in 1976-77, and the three who were nominated in 1977-78 - one professor, one postdoctoral fellow, and one doctoral candidate - could have been nominated as "professors or specialists" under 1(D)1. Each sought stays of four to six weeks. In any case, the professor eventually withdrew; the student suffered delays and access problems; and the fellow, who was holding a Killam scholarship, was effectively refused. The latter sought access to Russian archives in Riga and Tallin for his study of eighteenth century European trade, but MINVUZ stalling finally forced him to do the work in Finland instead. Overall, there has been little reward, and a very heavy administrative burden, in the operation of clause 1(D)5. Of eight Canadians nominated over four years, five spent a total of 20 weeks in the USSR, two candidates were refused, and one withdrew. Of the five participants, two considered their brief stays as profitable; two complained of delays and access problems; and the reaction of one is unknown.

In light of this record, it is surprising that at the last meeting of the Mixed Commission, 1(D)5 became a two-way clause: "both sides agree to accept annually on a reciprocal basis for a period of up to six weeks each, up to seven scholars to conduct research primarily in the institutions of higher learning of the receiving side . . . ." Costs were also placed on the same basis as the costs for 1(D)1 and 1(D)2, with the host party responsible for accommodation and living expenses. Although the Soviets have never shown much interest in short-term research at Canadian institutions, the revisions in clause 1(D)5 appear to have been agreed upon as a concession to the Russians for the reduction of the 1(D)2 student quota. Council staff may also have felt that a reciprocal clause would add room for manoeuvre, and thus spur easier administration and better treatment for scholars. But whatever the rationale, the Canada Council's successors do not want to activate the clause. To forestall the possibility of nominations from MINVUZ, the SSHRC has refused to put forth Canadian candidates.

In taking over all the programs from the Canada Council, the SSHRC assumed full or partial responsiblity for the exchange of 37 scholars under the General Agreement: 10 students under 1(D)2; 20 professors or specialists under 1(D)1 and 1(C)1; and seven academics for short-term research under 1(D)5. For the 27 possible senior slots, there have never been more than 15 - 20 applications. As Table 5 shows, neither have there been more than 17 nominations once the selection committee has finished its work; and perhaps only a dozen of these scholars, on average, have possessed really strong credentials. A comparison with American figures is additionally instructive.

Table 7

Canadian and US Participants in Exchanges with the USSR

	1974-75		1975-76		1976-77	
1(D)2 students	(8)*	8	(12)	9	(12)	11
US equivalent clause	(50)	49	(47)	47	(45)	48
1(D)1 professors	(6)	6	(5)	5	(10)	0
US equivalent clause	(15)	11	(16)	12	(15)	9
1(C)1 professors	(2)	5	(5)	3	(5)	8
ACLS/Academy Exchange	(16)	8	(16)	13	(16)	17

*Figures in parentheses represent the number of Soviet participants.

Table 7 shows that the US and the USSR have exchanged roughly four times the number of students exchanged by Canada and the Soviet Union. The proportionate difference in the exchange of professors is generally much smaller. Clearly, there are grounds for the elimination of clause 1(D)5, as well as for some additional reduction in the quota of professors. Before putting forth any suggestions in this regard, however, the characteristics of the 1(C)1, 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 exchanges should be discussed, and the experience of Canadian participants assessed.

III CLAUSE 1(D)2 - EXCHANGE OF JUNIOR SCHOLARS

Clause 1(D)2 in the program of cooperation for 1978-79 states that Canada and the USSR will:

> . . . exchange graduate students and young postdoctoral scholars in principle not older than 35, to further their studies as well as to conduct research in the pure and applied sciences, in the social sciences, the humanities and the arts; annually at least ten persons from each side for a term of up to ten months in each case, including five-week courses before the beginning of the academic year to improve the competence in the English or French or Russian languages of the above-mentioned graduate students and young postdoctoral scholars.

The Annex to the agreement specifies that the sending party provides transportation to and from the destination, and that the host party provides tuition fees, suitable free accommodation, free medical care, expenses related to internal travel for purposes of research, and a stipend of 180 rubles (or its dollar equivalent) per month. Clause 1(D)2 further declares that "both sides will attempt to maintain the level of existing exchanges and to achieve a more balanced representation of the participants in these exchanges." As Table 8 shows, the program to date has permitted 59 Canadian students to spend a total of 572 man-months in the USSR. Canada, in turn, has accepted 65 Soviet 1(D)2 candidates for a total of 636 months. The following account offers a comparative analysis based on candidate characteristics, and an evaluation of both Canadian host and student experience with the exchange.

Table 8

1(D)2 Exchange of Students

	Canadian (administered by AUCC)		Soviet (administered by Canada Council)	
Year	No. of candidates	No. of man-months	No. of candidates	No. of man-months
1972-73	6	60	5	50
1973-74	7*	62	7	70
1974-75	8	80	8	74
1975-76	9	89	12	119
1976-77	11	105	12	120
1977-78	11	106	14	133
1978-79	7	70	7	70
Totals	59	572	65	636

*Eight students were actually accepted, but one left almost immediately after arriving in Moscow because of family illness. The total of 59 includes five musicians (two in 1974-75, one in 1975-76, and two in 1977-78) whose exchanges were administered by Canada Council.

1(D)2 Regional Distribution and Institutional Affiliation

The 59 Canadian students who spent an academic year working in the Soviet Union, and those who are being nominated to go in 1979-80, represent every region of Canada except the Maritimes. The largest number of students have come from McGill (nine), Alberta (eight) Université de Montréal (seven), and the University of Ottawa (seven - including three on the 1979-80 slate). The University of Toronto has provided only five candidates, surprisingly few in light of that university's interests and own exchange history. Queen's, UBC and Waterloo have each sent three students under the provisions of the General Exchanges Agreement; Laval and the University of Saskatchewan have each sent two. Calgary, Victoria, Western, Guelph, Québec and McMaster contributed one apiece. Carleton University sent two students, in addition to the 20 who have participated over the last decade in Carleton's own bilateral exchange with Leningrad. One Carleton nominee in 1973-74 who spent the year working at Leningrad on his MA thesis returned to the USSR in 1977-78 under the terms of the General Exchange to do research for his PhD. At the time of their selection, seven Canadian students were enrolled at foreign institutions - Harvard, Columbia, University of Minnesota, University

of California, University of St. Andrews, and University of London (two). Three of the five Canada Council young artists were also studying abroad - at conservatories in Rome, Vienna and San Francisco. The other two were students at McGill and Cambrian College in Sudbury.

The extent to which a university is active in sending scholars under the exchanges does not appear to be related to the degree of its participation as a host. The only exception to this generalization is that Maritime universities tend not to participate in either way: only one Maritime university has ever acted as host to a Soviet young scholar. One institution has borne a disproportionate share of the host responsibility. Of 65 Soviet junior researchers, 20 (of whom 16 were engineers) spent their terms at the University of Toronto. McMaster and UBC each accepted seven; another six went to Waterloo and four spent their year at the Université de Montréal. Almost half of all the Canadian students who have travelled to the USSR under the General Exchange have come from four institutions - Montréal, McGill, Ottawa and Alberta. Yet the latter three have each hosted only two Soviet students over the years, the same number as Calgary, Queen's, Western, Guelph and Concordia. Besides assuming responsibility for the three students who came under the Leningrad exchange,[14] Carleton accepted one young researcher under the General Exchanges Agreement, as did the Universities of New Brunswick and Saskatchewan. York, Québec, Laval, Manitoba, Victoria, Dalhousie and all other universities in the Maritimes except UNB are among the institutions which have never sponsored a Soviet 1(D)2 scholar.

The dispersal is partly a reflection of Soviet preference. Until 1976, for example, no Soviet young researcher ever listed Alberta as a possible place of study. For seven years, as a result of the Dotsenko defection, Alberta was the object of an informal Soviet boycott. Conversely, Soviet engineering students will almost always list the University of Toronto as their number one choice. The engineering faculty's international reputation, and the fact that Soviet engineers have been training there since the mid-1960s, make the selection almost inevitable. It is also true that since the vast majority of Soviet students were in the pure or applied sciences rather than the social sciences or the humanities, it took time for the Canada Council to build a network of contacts in unfamiliar fields. As a consequence, there developed a natural tendency to rely on the same experienced professors and departments. An agency with a wider knowledge of the scientific community might have been able to involve a broader segment of interested faculty.

14Data provided by Carleton show a numerical imbalance in the exchange of students and faculty, which has worked to Canadian advantage. From 1968 to 1978, Carleton sent 38 students and faculty, but Leningrad sent only 12 - three students and nine professors.

1(D)2 Sex, Age and Academic Rank

The distribution of Canadian students participating in the 1(D)2 exchange is almost evenly divided between the sexes. The overall ratio in the first seven years of the program is 46.5 female to 53.5 male, with the percentage of females steadily growing over the years. Figures for 1978-79 and for the projected 1979-80 program show women now outnumbering men - five to two, and six to three. The interest and involvement of this large percentage of Canadian women in the junior exchange with the Soviet Union stands in striking contrast to the senior programs, where women make up less than 8% of Canadian participants.

On the Soviet side, women make up 12% of the senior exchange program, but the junior scholars are almost exclusively male. Only one of all the Soviet 1(D)2 nominees in the years from 1972-73 through 1979-80 is a woman. Since US/USSR programs show a similar distribution, one might conclude that Soviet officials generally prefer not to send women on long-term research trips to North American institutions.

The one exception in the Canadian case was a biologist who worked for 10 months at the University of Toronto in 1972-73. At 25, she was also the youngest Soviet scholar ever to participate. Soviet candidates have ranged in age from 25 to 37, and their Canadian counterparts from 21 to 34. However, the following table shows that most Soviet "junior researchers" have been in their early to middle-thirties, while most Canadians have been fully a decade younger.

Table 9

1(D)2 Exchange of Students

Birth Cohort	Soviet	Canadian
1935-39	10	1
1940-44	41	5
1945-49	12	21
1950-	1	32
Total	64*	59

*There were 65 candidates from 1972-1979, but the file and hence birth date of one is missing.

As these numbers vividly demonstrate, 80% of Soviet 1(D)2 scholars were born before 1945, while 90% of Canadians were born on or after that date. The ages of the nominated students for 1979-80 confirm the established pattern. The oldest Canadian is 32 and the youngest is 20, but seven of the nine were born after 1950. The Soviet candidates, on the other hand, range in age from 28 to 34 and nine of the 10 were born before that date.

Canadian participants are not only much younger; they are also academically far junior to their Soviet counterparts. Table 10 reveals over half the Canadians as young postgraduates working on their master's theses. All but one of the remainder have been working toward PhDs. All but one of the Soviet candidates, on the other hand, had already attained the approximate equivalent of a PhD - the "candidate" degree, and 30% of these held the positions of assistant or associate professor.

Table 10

1(D)2 Exchange of Students

	MA level	Doctoral level	Postdoctoral or "research worker"	Assistant professor	Associate professor	Total
Canadian	35	27	1	0	0	63
Soviet	0	1	52	11	11	75

The Soviet total includes the nominees for the 1979-80 year. The Canadian total also includes that year's contingent, but excludes the five Canadian artists who fall outside the usual academic ranking. Canadian scholars on the 1(D)2 exchange are also academically junior to their American counterparts. The International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) Annual Reports show that the United States reserves its equivalent program for more advanced graduate students and for young faculty. Of the 54 Americans who went to the USSR on the young scholars' exchange in 1975-76, for example, there were no students at the master's level. Instead, 38 PhD candidates, one "independent researcher," one lecturer, 12 assistant professors and two associate professors participated. This distribution seems more in accord with the level of Soviet candidates sent to North American universities.

Canadian officials have been aware, over time, of the discrepancies in their exchange of young scholars. But the effort to achieve better balance in academic status has focused primarily on age. In earlier years, the Canadians indicated an informal preference for Soviet candidates who were younger than 35. At the Mixed Commission meeting in January 1978, Canadian negotiators were able to

secure the actual insertion of the phrase "in principle not older than 35" within clause 1(D)2. But in determining who is or is not a "junior scholar" age is not the only criterion, nor is it necessarily the most valid. Many of the Soviet participants who were less than 35 years old could not be counted as junior scholars on any other score. One of the 1(D)2 associate professors, for instance, was also Vice-Dean of Research at his institution and the author of over 40 publications. Indeed, when assessing levels of academic competence, the number of publications seems a more relevant factor than age. Measured on that basis, the disproportions in rank between Soviet and Canadian 1(D)2 candidates are even more glaring. The data sheets of the 12 Soviet "graduate students and young scientific workers" who came to Canada in 1975-76 show four scholars with three to seven publications, three with 10 or more, two with 15, two with 30 and one candidate with over 40 publications and 12 patents. The lack of Canadian sensitivity to academic authorship as a useful measure of rank is suggested by the fact that in the last few years, Canadian officials stopped asking the Soviets to list all publications. A list of only those articles pertinent to the course of the research they wish to pursue in Canada now appears the sole requirement.

Insistence on age as the primary determinant of 1(D)2 qualifications may be working to Canadian disadvantage in other ways. Just as there are 34 year old physicists with over 40 publications, there are also 37 year old historians who are working on PhDs. The age stipulation clearly discriminates against those Canadians who change professions or who otherwise take up their academic careers rather later than the norm. One of this year's applicants, a 39 year old PhD candidate, was regarded by the AUCC staff and selection committee as an excellent potential nominee. But External Affairs would not permit her nomination to go forward on the grounds that an exception to the "in principle not older than 35" rule would set an undesirable precedent.[15]

Redressing the imbalance in the academic levels of Canadian and Soviet young scholars would require reconsideration of the basis for qualification. Preference might be given to Soviet nominees who are within five years of receiving the Candidate of Sciences degree, and who have less than 15 publications.[16] (In most cases, such a

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[15]She could also have been nominated under clause 1(D)5, but for reasons given elsewhere in this report, SSHRC has been unwilling to activate it. At the time of writing, External Affairs appears to have been persuaded. The candidate is now being nominated as the 10th Canadian 1(D)2 scholar for the 1979-80 academic year.

[16]The data sheets do not now ask the Soviets for the dates of their degrees.

provision would automatically favour Soviet candidates who are under 35.) Officials might also consider sending fewer Canadians at the master's level. While continuing to support excellence at all stages of graduate work, the emphasis might be placed on doctoral candidates, postdoctoral fellows and assistant professors. Almost one-third of the Canadian scholars who went to the Soviet Union on the 1(D)1 "senior" exchange have been 35 or younger, and thus could have been included within 1(D)2. Moreover, most of these assistant professors sought the maximum five month term for research, and some would have liked to stay for an entire academic year. The Canadian Embassy in Moscow has observed that almost all of the other foreign students who travel to the USSR under their equivalent national agreements have been senior PhD candidates who knew exactly what they wanted to see and study. In contrast, the embassy reported, Canadian students were often at exploratory stages. With less well-defined topics, they were less able than other foreign scholars to impress the Soviet bureaucracy with the validity of their requests for research trips and need for archival access.

1(D)2 Language Competence

In the Canadian Embassy view, the ability to deal effectively with the Soviet bureaucracy also depended in part on language competence. Canadian science students or young artists might not need Russian to pursue their laboratory research or musical training, but some knowledge of the language made the administrative side of university life in the USSR easier and psychologically more tolerable. Indeed, the language problems of Canadian and Soviet students during the first program years led officials to agree, at the Second Meeting of the Mixed Commission, that the ten-month stay in the host country should thereafter include "five-week courses before the beginning of the academic year to improve . . . competence in the English or French or Russian languages . . ."

For Canadians, the usefulness of language training in Moscow appears to vary according to existing levels of proficiency. The few who were most fluent found little to help them perfect their command, but the majority who were less advanced generally valued the course. The 13 participants who had minimal or no Russian competence - the scientists, musicians and students of other Slavic languages - apparently gained least from the experience. Repeated observation of this phenomenon led embassy officials to suggest that all students possess at least a modicum of Russian, with the level of required training determined by the student's field. According to the embassy most scholars in the social sciences or humanities need a good prior knowledge of Russian in order to carry out useful work. Given the relative shortness of the students' stay, trying to learn enough of the language in situ for either scholarly discussion or in-depth reading posed too difficult a problem. On the other hand, the embassy

concluded that if a student's interest was political science or some other subject where an ability to move around and develop a feel for the country was important, then language weakness might be less critical.[17]

Only two of the 65 Soviet young scholars who came to Canada between 1972 and 1979 claimed to be French-speaking. The rest declared a competence in English, and most rated their knowledge of the language as good. Comments from host universities suggest that in a third or more of the cases, this self-rating was greatly exaggerated. A professor from the University of Toronto, who had a decade of experience with Toronto's own exchange program, told the Canada Council in 1974 that two months of a Soviet researcher's time was generally required for intensive language training. The Canada Council had itself discovered during the first year of the agreement that some form of English study was needed. In the second year of the initial program, therefore, before institutionalizing the requirement at the meeting of the Mixed Commission, the Council assumed the cost of English lessons for four of the seven Soviet candidates. For a total of $344 per scholar, the Russians were offered 35 hours of instruction per week for four subsequent weeks. In the following year, according to the negotiated terms of the second (1974-75) program, the duration of study increased by one week, and the cost per scholar rose to $480.18 By 1977-78, the Council was paying over twice that amount per scholar - $1,081 to the University of Ottawa for a five-week course beginning in August each year.[19] In those cases where Soviet researchers arrived too late for University of Ottawa instruction, special (and sometimes more expensive) arrangements were made. An example in 1978-79 is an architectural engineer who is studying at Concordia. His need for an English tutor in Montreal cost the Government of Canada $781.25 for 50 hours of instruction plus language lab - a period of study that is approximately one-third the time spent by Soviet scholars in 1973-74, but which costs more than twice as much. Despite the inflated expense, hosts agree that the weeks of intensive language study are helpful and important in

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[17]Nine students knew a Soviet language other than, or in addition to Russian. One Canadian was of Latvian descent; four spoke Armenian and four knew Ukrainian.

[18]French language study that year was more expensive. One of the two French-speaking Soviet 1(D)2s was fluent, but in 1974-75 the other required $954 worth of Berlitz instruction.

[19]In 1969, the basic language training program cost the University of Toronto $200 per scholar. Thus in ten years, costs have risen more than 500%.

ameliorating communication problems with their guests. Even those Soviet scholars with acceptable levels of English proficiency seem to require a period of immersion to help them overcome an initial awkwardness and difficulty of expression. Moreover, since the majority of Canadian students appear to derive considerable benefit from their study of the Russian language while in the USSR, it seems clear that this part of the exchange is functioning on a generally reciprocal basis.

1(D)2 Fields of Study

Some officials see the significant differences in choice of discipline among Canadian and Soviet candidates as an unreciprocal aspect of the 1(D)2 program. Ninety-five per cent of the Soviets are in fields of pure or applied science, compared to 20% in the Canadian case. In the seven years since the signing of the General Exchanges Agreement, Canada has sent five young biologists to study in the Soviet Union, and seven students in other scientific fields - physics, chemistry, marine geology, engineering and meteorology. The largest number of Canadian students (25) have been in the area of Slavic language, literature and linguistics. There have also been eight historians and six candidates interested in music or musicology. The rest have been students of archeology, law, theatre arts, psychology, geography and political science. A glance at the fields of the nine nominees for 1979-80 reveals the trend to be more pronounced. The majority (six) are in the area of Russian language and literature. The others are in history, musicology and, for the first time, business administration. There are no scientists on next year's slate.

In contrast, nine of the 10 Soviets nominated for the 1979-80 program are scientists - four engineers and one specialist in each of these fields: physics, metallurgy, agronomy, mathematics and cybernetics. This distribution corresponds with the established pattern. Over the years, half of all Soviet participants have been engineers, an obvious reflection of the fact that cooperation with the West has always been geared toward Soviet industrial development. The next largest number of Russian candidates (eight) have also been in an applied field - mining geology and metallurgical science. In addition, there have been candidates in transportation technology (one), computer science (four), agriculture (three), and forest mapping by remote sensing (one), as well as students in the "pure" sciences - physics (five), chemistry (three), biology (one) and mathematics (one). The presence of a Soviet geographer in 1978-79 and of one historian on the list of Soviet nominees for 1979-80 may be a response to an expressed Canadian unhappiness with the imbalance of the exchange. At the 1978 meeting of the Mixed Commission, a new phrase was inserted in the program for 1978-79: ". . . both sides will attempt . . . to achieve a more balanced representation of the participants . . . ." If the history nominee does come to Canada in

1979-80, he will be the second historian but only the fourth social scientist out of 75 Soviet 1(D)2 candidates.[20]

Canadians should continue to press the Soviets to send humanists and social scientists on the young scholars exchange, but it would be unrealistic to expect any basic alteration in Soviet orientation. If officials wish to attain a better balance among the fields of study, they might concentrate on trying to send a higher percentage of young scientists to the USSR. Given the number of Canadians who participate in the senior NRC exchange now administered by NSERC (13 to 15 persons annually), the AUCC's apparent inability to attract more young scientists to the junior program seems surprising. Indeed, as the following table shows, interest in the junior scientific exchange with the USSR appears to have peaked in 1976-77, with the number of candidates in scientific fields decreasing ever since.

Table 11

1(D)2 Exchange of Students

Year	Total no. of Canadian applicants	Science applicants	Science candidates	Total no. of Canadian candidates
1972-73	53	8	1	6
1973-74	31	5	2	7
1974-75	41	5	2	8
1975-76	34	6	2	9
1976-77	34	9	3	11
1977-78	19	2	1	11
1978-79	24	4	1	7
Total to date			12	59
1979-80	31	3	0	9*

*Projected

The dramatic drop in the overall number of applications for 1977-78 offers some explanation, but as the general total begins to rise again, the number of science applications does not increase proportionately. In 1976-77, one out of four Canadian applicants (and candidates) were scientists. In 1978-79, the figure is one out of six applicants and for 1979-80, the percentage decreases to the 1977-78 level of one in 10.

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[20]Besides two historians and a geographer, there was one Soviet candidate in the field of architecture.

This decline in interest must be attributed to the problems encountered by a majority of Canadian science students in the Soviet Union. Only two of the six candidates who travelled to the USSR in 1975, 1976 and 1977 reported the experience as a personal and professional success. One of the latter scientists referred to his time at the University of Riga as "the most valuable year I have ever spent anywhere." The other four encountered serious difficulties. Their tales of woe, which tend to be widely disseminated within the student and scientific community, may have discouraged potential applicants. One student in 1976-77 was compelled to choose a topic other than that which he had intended to pursue, because the faculty at Leningrad University was not doing his type of research. He was eventually able to do some interesting work in a different area, but a second student suffered other, more serious problems. This student, a 22 year old biologist from a western university, was placed at Moscow State University and promised access to the Institute for Industrial Hygiene and Occupational Diseases. Despite embassy appeals to MINVUZ, he never gained access. He returned to Canada three months early, and told the AUCC that academically, his time had been wasted. Through the embassy, the AUCC learned that the Institute had been reluctant to accept him all along, and had only appeared to acquiesce under MINVUZ pressure. The student's youth, and the sensitivity of his topic (low intensity microwave radiation) were additional obstacles. Another biologist, who was posted to Leningrad State University in 1975-76, ran into similar difficulties in beginning his research project on pest control. After gaining laboratory space by switching faculties at Leningrad, he still found it impossible to consult with the people in the institutes who were doing the important work in his field. From brief telephone conversations, he knew they were interested in substantive discussions, but the institute bureaucracy would not make the arrangements.

These unhappy experiences cannot be chalked up just to Soviet intransigence. Part of the problem lies in an apparent failure to understand the dictates of the Soviet system of higher education. The examples of the two science students who enjoyed successful stays in 1976-77 and 1977-78 are instructive. In both cases, the students had prior confirmation of their welcome from the laboratories at the University of Riga and Leningrad Polytechnical Institute where they wished to pursue their research. These institutions issued the invitation, and then worked through MINVUZ to secure the students' placements. This arrangement functioned in precisely the opposite way from the usual pattern, where Canadians approach MINVUZ and MINVUZ approaches the place of study. Since only 5 or 6% of all scientific research carried out in the USSR takes place in the universities which are under MINVUZ jurisdiction, access to the institutes affiliated with the Academy of Sciences is essential for most foreign scientists. Direct prior contact is necessary. Without it, months may pass in fruitless efforts to gain access and students may not be able to avoid the sort of misfortune described above.

The absence of coordination among the different agencies involved in the exchange is another part of the problem. Canadian science students have not been able to make full and effective use of existing links. If both sides of the 1(D)2 program had been administered by the same agency (or at least in closer cooperation), the presence of so many young Soviet scientists in Canada could have been turned to the advantage of Canadian students. Indeed, the two young scientists who spent productive years at Riga and at Leningrad Polytechnical both received their invitations from Soviet scholars who had been earlier participants in the 1(D)2 exchange. Moreover, in placing Canadian science students, administrators have not taken advantage of the numerous scientific links formed through the long-standing NRC/Academy of Sciences exchange. In this regard, the case of an Alberta physics student is illustrative. Placed at Moscow State University for the 1975-76 year, he was informed just before his departure from Alberta that he was being assigned to Leningrad instead. The latter university did not have the equipment he needed for his work in laser research, so he wasted five months before finally securing a stay in the Physics Faculty at Moscow, where he had originally wanted to work. His project, however, was not the one he had initially submitted but another that he could readily have completed in Canada. Then a month before his projected departure from the USSR, this student received an invitation to do research on his primary topic of interest at the prestigious P.N. Lebedev Physical Institute in Moscow. The student, through physicists at his home university or through the AUCC, should have been told that under the NRC/Academy exchange, a program of cooperative research in laser and plasma physics had been going on between Canadians and the Lebedev Institute since the mid-1960s. At least a dozen Soviet scientists have visited Canadian facilities under the program. With better coordination he might have used the NRC connection to solicit an invitation from the Lebedev Institute (and from the Physics Faculty at Moscow to which it is informally linked) before he left Canada, thus assuring himself of a useful period of study in the USSR.

The need for laboratory space and specialized equipment means that no science student should be sent to the Soviet Union simply on MINVUZ say-so, without a direct commitment from the appropriate university department or additional invitation from a research institute. In most cases, prior contacts could be arranged through closer interagency consultation. If policy-makers truly wish to improve the ratio of science students to those in the social sciences and humanities, the most effective approach would be to employ fully the existing links created over 20 years of NRC exchange and seven years of the young scholars program. Canadian officials may decide, on the other hand, that the present asymmetry is acceptable. This seems to be the American view, for less than 5% of participants in the IREX junior exchange are US scientists or engineers. Although the IREX channel is the only channel open to American predoctoral

scholars, US students in the sciences "generally are reluctant to undertake lengthy sojourns at Soviet university laboratories, whose experimental equipment is not likely to be the equal of that found at home. There are some notable exceptions, including mathematics, but they only tend to underline the main tendency."[21]

1(D)2 Candidate Evaluation

Moscow State University has received almost twice as many 1(D)2 students as Leningrad (30 to 17) while the universities at Kiev, Yerevan and Tbilisi each accepted two Canadians. As noted earlier, one young scientist of Latvian descent spent his year at the University of Riga. Another went to Voronezh. No matter where they study, however, the AUCC does not require returning scholars to file follow-up reports. Thus the agency generally hears about only two kinds of experience. Those students who encounter serious difficulties, and those who attain extraordinary success, are those who feel compelled to write. The rest - some 60% of the total - largely remain silent. It would be helpful in any future weighing of the program to have a final statement of its perceived value (and/or difficulties) from each individual participant.

Nevertheless, it is clear from the available comment in the files, from interviews, press accounts and embassy reports that the majority believe they have benefited substantially from their period of study in the USSR. Four of the five Canada Council young artists expressing a view were especially vocal in praise of the exchange, and of the training they received at the Moscow Conservatory. A musicologist from McGill described her stay in Yerevan as a "fulfilling year and a great experience." A meteorology student from the University of Guelph observed that his stay in Leningrad had been "more rewarding than I thought possible." Of the 20%, overall, who reported serious problems in arranging access to archives and research institutes, perhaps only the young western biologist mentioned above regarded his trip as a complete waste of time. The following comment on eight months of work at Leningrad in 1974-75, from a Canadian PhD candidate, is typical not only of those on the junior exchange who endured access problems, but of scholars on the senior program as well.

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[21] C. Kaysen, Chairman, Review of US-USSR Interacademy Exchanges and Relations (National Academy of Sciences, Washington D.C., 1977).

> . . . my stay was by no means a loss academically. The little less than a month of work in the archives was most fruitful and rewarding. Besides this, I spent about four full months of work on newspapers and other published materials in the libraries. These materials are unavailable in the West and are of great value to my thesis. The other three months were spent in less fruitful library work, in calling Moscow . . . [and dealing with the bureaucracy] and in just seeing Leningrad and its people. Despite all the frustration, I have no regrets . . .[22]

The difficulties of archival access for students of history and literature are created by the same anomalies of Soviet bureaucratic structure which prevent science students from making contact with colleagues in Academy-linked institutes. Access to Soviet libraries is rarely a problem because libraries are usually under a university umbrella and therefore controlled by MINVUZ. Archives may be affiliated with the Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Archives, or in the case of a music respository, with the Ministry of Culture. Thus they generally lie outside the jurisdiction of MINVUZ. In almost every year of the program there has been one student, and occasionally more than one, in a field of the social sciences or humanities who has reported Soviet delaying tactics or other bureaucratic obstacles placed in the way of archival research. In 1978-79, the example was a doctoral candidate in history. This student, who was at Moscow University, complained that he was not given archival access until three months after his arrival, and that he had not been granted access to all the archives he wished to see. Moreover, although he then had permission to use the Academy-affiliated Central State Historical Archive in Leningrad, authorities in Moscow postponed his trip for two months "because there is no room at the Leningrad dormitory."[23] American students on the IREX exchange who had been to Leningrad told him, on the other hand, that there was ample space.

As this student correctly pointed out, the Canada/USSR agreement specifies that a candidate's notification of acceptance "must state . . . the archives to which candidates are granted access."[24]

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[22]Letter to the AUCC, 24 March 1976.

[23]Letter to the AUCC, 26 March 1979.

[24]Annex B, Program of Scientific, Academic and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation Between Canada and the USSR for 1978-79.

However, there was no joint placement meeting in the spring of 1978. The acceptance in this case came through the Soviet Embassy, and officials in Ottawa were apparently unable to press the Soviets on fulfillment of the access provision. But the student should not have been allowed to leave England for the USSR without Soviet approval of his specific research plans. Before the 1978 meeting of the Mixed Commission, Canadian Embassy officials were aware of such difficulties and recommended that the administrative arrangements which form part of the Program of Exchanges be modified so as to require advance written confirmation of "conditions precedent," that is of the various permissions and authorizations needed for a student to undertake his or her program. According to this suggestion, which is based upon the embassy's knowledge of American practices, no student from either side would be able to depart on an exchange until a considerable amount of the detailed paperwork had been done. Canadian students arriving in the Soviet Union would thus be able to start their academic work with a minimum of delay, and those whose authorizations were unobtainable would be spared the frustration of spending fruitless months of waiting in the Soviet Union. So far this recommendation has not yet been acted upon.

Besides the question of access to archives and scientific institutes, Canadian students have occasionally had difficulty in carrying out other aspects of their work program. While experience with academic supervisors at Soviet universities generally provokes little complaint, the odd student did encounter a professor who was not very knowledgeable about his topic or very helpful in arranging travel and conferences with colleagues. Depending on the year, and the particular location, some students also suffer from the incompetence or negative attitude of bureaucrats in Inotdel, the foreign department of a Russian university handling all matters related to a student's stipend, study plan and accommodation. Responsibility for approval of a Komandirovka, or official research trip, also rests with Inotdel and there have been instances - especially in the early years of the exchange - when Komandirovkas to Kiev, L'vov, Irkutsk, Novosibirsk and elsewhere have not been approved. Annex B of the agreement states that the host party will assume expenses related to internal travel "in accordance with the research . . . program approved by the receiving side." According to embassy officials, one source of tension was the fact that, while Canadian students tended to regard a Komandirovka as a right, Soviet university officials insisted upon justification. It appears, too, that Canadian students always feel inadequately briefed. They lament the fact that their handbooks (an idea conceived by students on the first year of the exchange) are outdated, and that they spend far too much time acclimatizing themselves to their new surroundings. Over and over again they recommend a briefing system akin to that enjoyed by the Americans, whereby candidates are assembled and told what to expect not only by program administrators, but also by former exchange students.

Dissatisfaction with living conditions in the USSR is another source of complaint. Accommodation and other facilities at Moscow University have generally been better than at Leningrad. In 1976, students at the latter institution told External Affairs Minister Don Jamieson that they had gone without heat or hot water for long periods, and were compelled to share their cramped space with Soviet room-mates.[25] A Canadian currently in Moscow, on the other hand, describes her residence as a "haven, particularly when I discovered that as a foreigner I had the [11' x 7'] room to myself."[26] The difficulties of shopping, and of long queues for everything from milk to concert tickets are also mentioned. Yet a comparison with the experience of students in the 1960s shows a substantial improvement in the physical environment. Canadians on the University of Toronto exchange encountered not only line-ups for food in shops and restaurants, but also great difficulty in finding essentials like eggs. In the winter of 1964, they could find no flour. Before the advent of special stores for foreigners in Moscow, and later in Leningrad, they were unable to supplement their diets or secure other provisions by means of hard currency purchasing. In the 1960s, and to a less extent in the early 1970s, students commented on the problems they faced as westerners in suspicious, often hostile surroundings. They felt watched, by their Soviet room-mates and others, and found it hard to make friends. They believed these psychological anxieties to be the very worst aspect of studying in the USSR. Such problems are no longer noted. Indeed, two of the 1978-79 students have married Soviet citizens and two more claim to be engaged, so the attention of Canadian officials is now centred on quite the opposite concern.

Since Canadians enjoy an open society and high standard of living, Canadian officials tend to view the exchange as inherently more advantageous to Soviet students than to their Canadian counterparts. Obviously, students from the USSR have access to the study materials and equipment they need and are well-accommodated in uncrowded, functional housing.[27] On the other hand, as Canadian hosts

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[25] The Gazette (Montreal), 4 November 1976

[26] The Globe and Mail (Toronto), 22 March 1979

[27] There are occasional, temporary exceptions. In 1978-79, a Soviet student at McMaster was confronted with a landlady who "did not supply him with clean linen, did not replace lightbulbs in the corridor outside his apartment door, left old mattresses in his bedroom and in the hallway, did not clean the place (there were large cobwebs everywhere). He seemed too embarrassed to tell me details about the bathroom . . . [which he had to share]." Letter on the student's behalf to SSHRC, 7 December 1978. The candidate was given permission to move.

report, Canada's high standard of living is expensive and Soviet students sometimes have problems making ends meet. Canadian students find their monthly stipend of 180 rubles sufficient, but its current 279-dollar equivalent often is not. As one host reported in 1976, his colleagues at Queen's regarded the living allowance (then $240) as "barely adequate, and the travel allowance as inadequate."[28] In the same year, a UBC professor stated his conviction that it is not possible, even with the lodging paid separately, "for an overseas visitor to maintain an average standard of living in Vancouver" on the Canada Council allowance.[29] The Council's response to these expressions of concern was always that the rate of subsistence is determined on a reciprocal basis and that it is up to the sending country to supplement allowances. Canada gave additional grants to its own candidates in the USSR ($70 per month in D-coupons for purchases at foreign stores), and assumed that the Soviet Union was doing the same. Bound by the principle of reciprocity, the Council insisted that Canadian universities were not expected to offer additional financial assistance. Nevertheless, individual hosts - out of their liking and respect for particular Soviet colleagues - sometimes feel compelled to supplement the monthly stipend. Others, among those who regard the stipend as sufficient for food, recreation, clothing, books, local transportation, laundry and other incidentals, supplement the research travel allowance. In the majority view, a $15 per diem for the cost of hotel and meals, while in the course of an officially approved Komandirovka, is a grievously inadequate amount.

1(D)2 Host Evaluation

Reciprocity is also the rationale behind other restrictions on Soviet young scholars, restrictions which are often regarded as inconvenient, annoying and sometimes even embarrassing to university hosts. Canadians in the USSR are not permittted to go more than 25 miles away from their assigned place of study without securing a visa for domestic travel. Soviet students in Canada, therefore, are not permitted to travel beyond a similar 25 mile radius until their hosts have secured permission from Canadian immigration authorities. While officials generally grant that permission, hosts feel that opportunities for important forms of spontaneous social interaction are lost. A UBC professor complained, for example, of being unable simply to pick up and go to Victoria for the day. Others observed that the chance for a visiting scientist to inspect an industrial site or other facility may occur on short notice and that the notification

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[28]Letter to the Canada Council, 29 June 1976.

[29]Letter to the Canada Council, 7 May 1976.

requirement seems petty and shortsighted. "I cannot avoid commenting," wrote one professor, "that the reason given for the necessity of such permission, i.e. as a reprisal for the way Canadian research scientists are treated in the Soviet Union is distasteful . . . ."[30]

Interestingly, Canadians in engineering, physics, chemistry and other sciences demonstrate a high level of appreciation for the cultural value of the exchange. A number of scientists stated in interviews that they thought they understood its socio-political significance rather better than Canada Council or even External Affairs. The former's argument that even with restrictions, "Soviet visitors are far better treated here than are Canadians over there" cuts little ice. Hosts seem to feel that the generous treatment of Soviet scholars, no matter how unreciprocated, can only redound to Canadian advantage. Some noted the personal friendships which ensued, and the "red carpet" handling of their own follow-up visits to the USSR. Others, convinced of the superiority of the Canadian (as opposed to the Soviet) system and culture, pointed to the significant propaganda value. All generally agreed that administration of the program would benefit by the removal of various nit-picking, "tit-for-tat" procedures. For example, several mentioned arguments with Canada Council over provision of an extra $15 a month for television rental, when a set was not included in furnished accommodation. Canadian students in the USSR are not provided with T.V., but host scientists perceived enormous cultural and language-training advantage in everyday access to North American television. Similarly, all matters pertaining to a student's acommodation are taken care of by the recipient country, so housing-related monthly invoices, for a Soviet student's utilities and telephone as well as rent, have always been submitted by the university to the Council for payment. This procedure - an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile two entirely different housing systems - has resulted in a heavy administrative burden for both the hosts and the Council. Hosts regard the rule, whereby university departments or individual professors find themselves writing letters every month asking for payment of $8 telephone bills, as a sample of bureaucratic madness. Regular pleas for change, for a small basic grant to either the Soviet scholar or the department to handle these little bills, have been met in the past by lectures on the intricacies of reciprocity. Yet as hosts correctly observe, elimination of this

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30Letter to the Canada Council, 11 March 1975.

petty red tape would save both aggravation and money. Candidate files are replete with instance upon instance of ways in which Council staff members ought not to be spending their time.[31]

Hosts have also been burdened with the problem of securing suitable accommodation for Soviet young scholars, and in the case of off-campus housing, the universities act as liaison between the Council, the landlord and the student. Since Soviet students cannot generally afford to eat out or pay dormitory food contracts, they usually require kitchen facilities, and in many cities small furnished apartments are very difficult to find. (Several university departments around the country now own, as a result, complete sets of linen, tableware, dishes, pots, pans, and other household equipment.) Hosts must also put up with bureaucratic snarls. Some, like the failure to receive word on an impending arrival or the delay in issuance of a cheque, are the fault of Canadian administrators. A greater number of difficulties - cancellation of a visit after weeks of preparation, repeated changes in the anticipated starting date - are the responsibility of the Russians. A host's duties are time-consuming. Introducing Soviet students to the new environment, preparing travel itineraries to other universities are tasks which may take days or even weeks. There is also a dollar cost to hosts, both in terms of out-of-pocket expense for hospitality (e.g. a trip to Niagara Falls), and in terms of monies dispensed from research grants or departmental funds to cover the purchase of equipment, photocopying, slide-making, computer time, printing, library search service, drafting, long-distance telephone charges, overseas postage and other incidentals.

When queried in interviews, many of the professors and university administrators who had hosted Soviet scholars stated a requirement for some sort of grant to cover these unreimbursed expenses. All noted the increased stringency of university budgets in the last few years and/or cutbacks in funds for research. Hosts generally were unable to agree, however, on an approximately appropriate figure. Indirect costs, and their significance as a problem in both the junior and senior exchange, vary widely according to field and type of research, location of the university, size of a host professor's research grant, and calibre of Soviet scientist. In a number of instances, according to interview sources, indirect costs are absorbed and balanced by the

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[31]For examples in 1978-79, see a Council staff letter to the Bell Canada business office in Hamilton, 29 December 1978, pointing to an error in the bill of a Soviet visitor, and noting that "confusion has been piled upon confusion." See also another letter to the City of Calgary, 19 February 1979, which straightens out the account of another visitor and encloses a cheque for $10.01 to cover the outstanding balance.

provision of critically-needed manpower.[32] If a professor receives a competent Soviet scholar, whose interests fit in with the host's ongoing research, the extra cost is negligible compared with the value of an extra pair of hands. In some cases, tightened budgets have meant the loss of salaries for personnel but only minimal loss of funds for equipment or photocopying. This seems particularly true of universities where cutbacks have been less severe (e.g., Alberta), and of departments with long-term major research commitments (e.g., electrical engineering at Toronto).

In setting forth the possibility that unabsorbed research costs could be funded through limitations on internal travel, hosts insisted that the provision for a Komandirovka, for one research trip to other laboratories and facilities in Canada, was often the most valuable part of the exchange. Scientific justification varies by field. In some areas, travel is critical because the key work is going on at three or four different centres scattered across Canada. In other sectors, the value is more cultural than scientific and, if necessary, a program could be carried out at just one institution. Nevertheless hosts believe that it is essential to give Soviet scholars a feel for the state of Canadian science, and that travel is an area where the Council should retain as much flexibility as possible. Some departments concede an entertainment burden in hosting Soviet visitors for short-term stays, but they are also usually glad to have their guests deliver lectures and seminars. While recognizing the problem of inflated domestic transportation costs (the per diem rate of $15 has never changed), there is still very strong consensus that the travel provision remains a vitally important part of the program.

Hosts who otherwise lament the lack of indirect cost support suggest solucions ranging from grants-in-aid of research ($4,000 - $5,000), to provision of small contingency funds ($200 - $500). The variation depends upon the field of work and on the host's experience in trying to integrate a Soviet researcher into an existing project. If new apparatus or materials are needed because of equipment failure, or because of a mutual decision to go off in a different direction, or (and this is most common) because a Soviet researcher has not clearly specified the facilities he thinks he will need, then unanticipated expenditures will be incurred. The successful matching of a Soviet scholar to a Canadian university laboratory is a difficult task, not made simpler by the absence of any scientific expertise or wide knowledge of the scientific community among program administrators. The information on Soviet data sheets is usually also inadequate. As noted earlier, the Soviets should again be asked to list all

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[32] One professsor in 1978-79, who is supervising a Soviet student in the field of transportation technology, reported not only absorption of costs but unique benefits in outside funding. The presence of a Soviet researcher helped him to secure a Ford Foundation grant for the study of socialist transportation systems.

publications. Some hosts also suggest that copies should be obtained of those papers directly relevant to the proposed course of study, even if these are in Russian. There should be more emphasis on the kind of research done in the past, and a clearer statement of objectives - of what the Soviet scholar expects to achieve in Canada.

Although the Canada Council operated the Soviet side of the young scholars exchange for six years, the staff never developed a regular mechanism for evaluation of a Soviet student's performance. The Soviet scholars were asked to file a final report, but their Canadian hosts were not. In 1975-76, for instance, the Council learned from an engineering student that he had investigated "the new method of synthesis of active RC filters," attended lectures and an international conference, travelled from Toronto to McMaster and Concordia, and hoped "to carry on correspondence and maintain contact" with Canadian scientists.[33] The Council did not learn that his supervisor personally regarded the whole exercise as "a waste of time."[34] Routine evaluative procedures are now being instituted, and future appraisals should be more accurate as well as easier to carry out.

Recent interviews have improved the known/unknown evaluation ratio, but there is still no information from hosts on approximately 30% of Soviet 1(D)2 scholars - notably those who participated in the earliest years of the exchange. For the remaining 70% of young researchers, hosts offer judgments ranging from the kind tersely provided by the above supervisor to quite the opposite extreme. One Canadian was so impressed with his candidate, a Soviet metallurgist, that he wrote External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp to express ". . . grande satisfaction . . . . Depuis son arrivée . . . (il) . . . contribue de façon fort significative à nos recherches en exploitation minière . . . . Ces travaux résulteront en d'importantes publications conjointes."[35] Indeed, two-thirds of host appraisals encompass a generally positive view. There are now evaluations for 45 of the 65 Soviets who have studied in Canada under clause 1(D)2, and 30 of these have been favourable. The remaining one-third of opinion divides into two kinds of negative judgment: seven hosts observed that there had been numerous difficulties, but that they had also received limited benefit from the exchange; eight others reported an entirely unsatisfactory experience on every level. In any given year, there is usually one - and occasionally two - Soviet students who give their supervisors (and the Council) little except one problem after another.

33Report to the Canada Council, 13 May 1976.

34Interview with the supervisor, 11 May 1979.

35Letter to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 11 March 1974 (Copy in Canada Council files).

The troublesome example in 1976-77 was a scholar who was accepted by a professor at McGill. Initial difficulties centred on his too-late arrival for the language course, and his complaints about accommodation. As his supervisor told the Council, "it took a great deal of my time to converse with him and to settle him down in a suitable apartment." The visitor made several unauthorized excursions to Ottawa, and caused his supervisor the "further strain" of checks by the RCMP. He also ran up a bill of $1,768.50 for research equipment (250 rolls of film for shock wave studies and 400 Mylar sheets for shock tubes), of which the Canada Council eventually paid $750. Upon the supervisor's request, the Council also authorized payment of $650 for assistance on a sentence-by-sentence correction of the visitor's research report - a report that was not of publishable quality. The supervisor felt, however, that its correction was "necessary to make your exchange program presentable," and that he would have had a "heart attack if I attempted to do all these corrections by myself."[36]

In 1977-78, this scholar's counterpart was a Soviet researcher, who was placed at one of Agriculture Canada's research laboratories in Winnipeg. In this case, his supervisor wrote a three-page letter to the Council which included the following comment:

> . . . [The visitor] . . . has neither shown any serious interest nor cared to learn anything beyond what is absolutely necessary . . . . Most of my colleagues and I are baffled by this scientist's attitude and feel that either he is hiding his lack of proper training, he does not care, or he is plain lazy. . . . It appears that his primary interests are: to have a good time and to travel to as many Canadian cities as possible at Canadian government expense . . . regardless of any scientific justification . . . .[37]

If a similarly unhappy experience occurred in the course of an exchange with France, Denmark or any other western country, the problems would probably be attributed to the unfortunate quirks of an individual personality. In an exchange with the USSR, participants tend to place a collective blame on the program as a whole. Thus this scholar's supervisor sent the Council a copy of a lengthy Newsweek article (10 October 1977), which discussed the gaps in science and

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[36]Letter to the Canada Council, 7 July 1977.

[37]Letter to the Canada Council, 27 January 1978.

technology between the US and USSR. "The attached," he wrote, "explains why we are having difficulty in working with the Soviet academic exchange scholars . . . ."

One negative encounter with a Soviet student will permanently affect university willingness to participate in the exchange. For example, a certain department of mineral engineering hosted, in 1975-76, a student whose sojourn was "pleasant and beneficial to all concerned." The Council was complimented on the "selection" of a fine scholar and the head of the department expressed his eagerness for another candidate who would emulate the first visitor's achievement.[38] His successor turned out, unfortunately, to be a "lazy bum"[39] and the department has never accepted another Soviet researcher. The universities' willingness to cooperate has also been undermined by the administrative burden of the program, even among the two-thirds who have sponsored hard-working and competent Soviet scientists. The perception of a frequently uncoordinated operation - replete with mismatched research interests, unanticipated costs, and seemingly petty restrictions - has eroded academic confidence in the government's ability to run a useful exchange of young scholars.

Nevertheless, it is also apparent that a majority of Canadian hosts see a significant value in the exchange. The benefits are not only cultural and political but scientific as well. All participants reporting positive encounters with Soviet students observe that the USSR clearly gains more, but that there are advantages for Canada too. Probably the most substantive of these is the opportunity to appraise the state of Soviet science in a host's particular field. To maintain an ongoing reliable assessment, Canadian scientists depend on the development of personal and institutional links. Although regular communication is difficult, hosts usually try to follow up a successful visit with letters and an exchange of publications. Soviet scientists do also, in some instances, make worthwhile contributions to a host's research program. Besides manpower, a mid- to top-level scientist may add some new bit of data or experimental technique to an investigation. Several hosts reported the receipt of interesting information from Soviet scholars who were just passing through, in the course of a research trip. However, Soviet students in the natural sciences are more likely to be useful than are students in engineering. Russian polytechnical institutes turn out large numbers

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38Letter to the Canada Council, 7 May 1976.

39Note on participant's file, 31 March 1977.

of engineers and most are very highly specialized. Engineering education in Canada is much broader in scope, and some Canadian engineers complain that their counterparts in the USSR (who constitute 50% of all Soviet candidates on the 1(D)2 exchange) are too restricted in focus, that research interests are therefore difficult to meld, and that the exchange thus tends to be one-sided. Others feel that while these objections are by and large valid, it is difficult to generalize about Soviet scientists. Their calibre varies, and Canadians have never been able to determine the USSR's criteria for selection. Even in engineering, there are outstanding candidates. An example in 1978-79 was one who was working at Toronto. His supervisor, who has looked after one or more generally competent Soviet scholars almost every year since inception of the old University of Toronto exchange, reported that for the first time he had had a student who could draw extensively on his own work in the USSR. Within three months of arriving in Canada, he and the visiting scholar had produced a joint paper. A second publishable article will be completed before the visitor departs. In assessing relative benefits, host professors also point, finally, to the important differences in absorptive capacity. The Soviets have great difficulty plugging North American science and technology into an organizational system which is plagued with rigidities, equipment shortages, and inadequate incentives. Canadians may gather far less in volume of information, but researchers are better able to make use of whatever they do receive.

IV CLAUSES 1(C)1 and 1(D)1 - EXCHANGE OF SENIOR SCHOLARS

Clause 1(D)1 in the program of cooperation for 1978-79 states that Canada and the USSR agree:

> To exchange professors and specialists who will do research in pure and applied sciences, in the social sciences and in the humanities on a reciprocal basis annually up to ten professors and specialists from each side for periods of from one to five months up to a total of 40 man-months. At the same time, both sides will attempt to maintain the level of existing exchanges and to achieve a more balanced representation of the participants in these exchanges in the pure and applied sciences and in the humanities and social sciences. These professors and specialists, on the invitation of the receiving side, may deliver separate lectures and reports.

The Annex to the agreement specifies that the sending party provides transportation to and from the destination and that the host provides university fees, suitable free accommodation, free medical and dental care, expenses related to internal travel for purposes of research, and a stipend of 12 rubles (or its dollar equivalent) per day.[40] As noted in a previous section of this report, the exchange is a numerically unbalanced one. Thirty-eight Soviet scholars have spent 118 man-months in Canada under clause 1(D)1, compared with the 24 Canadian professors who have spent only 43½ months in the USSR.

Canadian scholars proceeding to the USSR under clause 1(D)1 in the first two years of the agreement found that no provisions had been made which would permit them to work at what were often the most suitable Soviet facilities - the archives or research institutes affiliated with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Canadian physicists, chemists, geologists, biologists and others in the pure and applied sciences had access to the Academy through the latter's 1959 agreement with the National Research Council of Canada, but no equivalent existed for professors in the social sciences or the humanities. To resolve the problem, and to ensure Canadian access to such key centres as the Institute for World Economy and International Relations, the Institute of World History, the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute, and the Institute of Sociological Information and Social

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[40] In 1975, 12 rubles was equal to $14.40, but by 1978, the figure was $18.60.

Sciences, the Canada Council and the Soviet Academy concluded an agreement. Embodied in the program of cooperation for 1974-75 and in subsequent programs as clause 1(C)1, the Council/Academy agreement provides for the exchange of "specialists to conduct research and to give lectures in agreed areas of study in the social sciences and the humanities." For the "annually up to 10 persons" who might spend up to a total of 20 man-months in the host country, both sides also promised to "provide the conditions necessary for the fulfillment of agreed programs including access . . . when it is expedient and possible, to laboratories, archives and organizations which are not under the supervison of the Canada Council and the Academy." The two parties agreed further to encourage exchanges of books, publications, periodicals, and other documentary materials in the various fields.

The Annex to 1(C)1, like the Annex to 1(D)1, states that the host provides suitable free accommodation, free medical and dental care, and a stipend of 12 rubles (or its equivalent in dollars) per day. The sending party pays for transportation to Montreal or Moscow, and the receiving side pays for all internal travel "providing such travel is in accordance with the work program approved by the receiving side." Under 1(C)1, unlike 1(D)1, the host party also pays "up to $200 in Canada and an equivalent sum of rubles in the USSR" for photocopying and book purchasing, plus the cost of shipping the materials out of the country. The Council/Academy agreement, which was modelled on the NRC/Academy accord, states that participants will be "met upon arrival and seen off on departure." Nominations may be put forth at any time,[41] but the application must be submitted three months "prior to the intended date of arrival," and Council or Academy decisions on proposed programs must be offered within two months of their receipt. In the first four years of the exchange, 18 Canadian scholars spent a total of 35 man-months in the USSR, compared with 25 Soviet candidates who worked in Canada for a total of 41 months. If all of the 1978-79 contingent are able to proceed as anticipated, then 28 Canadians will have used a total of 55½ months under 1(C)1 by the end of 1979, compared with 34 candidates and a total of 51½ months in the Soviet case.

The 1(C)1 program was originally perceived as an exchange which would not diminish relations with the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education (MINVUZ), but which would simply recognize the different MINVUZ/Academy responsibilities in the various fields of the social sciences and the humanities. However the differences between the 1(C)1 and 1(D)1 programs for senior scholars

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41The provision for 1(D)1, as well as for the 1(D)2 exchange of junior scholars stipulates receipt of the nominations by February 20 each year.

are now much more than jurisdictional. While the Academy program is not without shortcomings, it has proved to be administratively less burdensome than the 1(D)1 exchange with MINVUZ. There are delays, sudden withdrawals, and problems with visas, but direct communications between the Council and the Academy,[42] and the Academy's higher status in the Soviet hierarchy, mean that difficulties are more readily resolved. Moreover, while the research interests of Canadian 1(C)1 and 1(D)1 candidates are generally similar, the interests and hence the characteristics of the Soviet side of each exchange are varied. The programs are shaped by the significant differences in Soviet choice of fields. Clause 1(D)1, like its counterpart 1(D)2 for junior scholars, is open to nominations in all disciplines. As a result (and again like the junior program), Soviet applicants are overwhelmingly scientists or engineers. Clause 1(C)1, on the other hand, is restricted to scholars in the social sciences or the humanities. Indeed, the negotiation of the Council/Academy agreement was motivated not only by a need for Canadian access to archives and institutes under Academy control, but also by a desire to ensure the exchange of at least some Soviet scholars in fields other than the pure or applied sciences.

1(C)1 & 1(D)1 Regional Distribution and Institutional Affiliation

A Canadian scholar in 1976-77, whose area of specialization is the history of psychiatry, was affiliated with a hospital. Otherwise, since the beginning of the agreement, all senior participants have been members of a university staff. When 1(C)1 and 1(D)1 candidates are grouped together on a regional basis, 20 scholars show Ontario affiliations; 11 come from Alberta; nine are from Quebec and five from Nova Scotia. The provinces of British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Manitoba are each represented by only one candidate. No senior (or junior) scholar from New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island or Newfoundland has ever travelled to the USSR under the General Exchanges Agreement. The largest number of professors have come from the Universities of Calgary (6), Alberta (4), Toronto (5), Ottawa (4), Waterloo (4) and McGill (3), with UBC, Lethbridge, Regina, Winnipeg, Windsor, Queen's, Western, Carleton, York, Québec, Laval, Montréal, Acadia, St. Francis Xavier and St. Thomas universities contributing one or two apiece. One candidate from Calgary, and three from Alberta, Queen's and St. Thomas have travelled to the USSR under clauses 1(D)1 and 1(C)1, respectively, for a second time.

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[42]This was not true in the first three years, when communications were channelled through the embassy and External Affairs.

In assessing the contribution of host universities to the senior exchange, important differences can be noted in the operation of the 1(C)1 and 1(D)1 programs. The latter shows a pattern of acceptance that is rather evenly distributed across several universities. Alberta, Waterloo and Toronto have each hosted six Soviet 1(D)1 candidates; Calgary accepted five; UBC and Ottawa both took four; Montréal, McGill and Carleton each had three; Queen's and Laval placed two; McMaster and l'Institut de Cardiologie de Montréal both accepted one.[43] The operation of clause 1(C)1, on the other hand, shows marked imbalance. Two universities have borne a disproportionate share of the host responsibility. Of the 30 Soviet visitors who have used the program to date, all but four have spent time at the University of Toronto. Carleton, which runs its own exchange of professors and students with Leningrad University, has been similarly generous. The latter has received 23 1(C)1 visitors since 1974, approximately twice the number entertained by the Universities of Ottawa, Montréal or McGill. In lesser numbers, Soviet scholars have also carried out social scientific research at Laval, Concordia and Québec, in addition to York, Western, Queen's and other Ontario institutions, but 1(C)1 candidates are just beginning to express an interest in western universities. Until 1977, only one Academician had visited British Columbia or Alberta. In the 1977-78 program year, six of the 13 candidates placed UBC on their itineraries, and four of these stopped at the Universities of Calgary or Alberta as well. On his second trip to Canada this year, the Academician mentioned above visited the Universities of Regina and Saskatchewan, the first 1(C)1 candidate to do so. Similarly, until recently, no 1(C)1 visitor except this one had displayed much interest in the Maritimes. In 1977-78, one candidate visited Dalhousie, but in 1978-79 - perhaps as a result of the developing Dalhousie program with the Pushkin Institute - three Soviet scholars have asked to stop in Halifax, and one has also applied for a visit to Acadia.

Maritime universities, and universities in two of the Prairie provinces, are underrepresented in the 1(C)1 exchange, and not represented at all in the 1(D)1 program. Elsewhere, patterns of host acceptance are related to Soviet choice of discipline. Apart from the University of Toronto, which has accepted a total of 26 scientists under the two 1(D)1 programs, and an equal number (but higher percentage) of social scientists under 1(C)1, there are inevitable differences. Universities excel in different areas, and placement depends in part on their relative strengths. Thus Carleton, which is strong in social scientific fields, has hosted 77% of the Soviets who

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[43]There have been 38 Soviet 1(D)1 scholars altogether, but the number of host institutions adds up to more because several candidates spent major portions of their stay at more than one university.

came to Canada under 1(C)1, but only 4% of the scientists and engineers who travelled under the 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 exchange.[44] Similarly, western universities (Calgary, Alberta and UBC), along with McMaster and Waterloo, have been more heavily utilized by Soviet scientists than by candidates under the 1(C)1 program. Conversely, McGill and the University of Ottawa have accepted a larger percentage of Soviet social scientists than of 1(D) scholars.

The Canada Council has tended to rely on the same experienced professors and departments when placing scientists on both the senior and junior exchanges. This may also be true with respect to assignments of Soviet social scientists. Members of York University's faculty, for example, complained that visiting scholars with an interest in Canadian Studies were almost invariably sent by the Canada Council to Carleton or the University of Toronto. This perception of inadequate attention to York's interests by those who administered the General Exchanges Agreement may help to explain why York recently concluded its own agreement with a counterpart institution in the USSR. So also has the University of Saskatchewan - in 1977, with Chernivtsi State University in the Ukraine - although Saskatchewan had not taken part in any General Exchange program until 1978-79. Soviet scholars, with limited information on the resources and capabilities of those Canadian universities which have not participated fully in the exchange, might resist placement at unfamiliar institutions, but an effort could be made to involve a larger segment of the university community.

1(C)1 and 1(D)1 Work and Travel Programs

The 1(D)2 exchange of junior scholars provides for a ten-month residence in the host country. The provisions for senior scholars are for shorter but more flexible stays. Under 1(C)1, a Soviet social scientist may come to Canada for a few days or a few months, so long as the total number for all Soviet candidates in a given year does not exceed 20 man-months. Under 1(D)1, candidates may work in host institutions for periods of from one to five months, and neither side has ever been able to use the full annual quota of 40 months. Calculations of the average length of stay for 1(C)1 and 1(D)1 Canadian and Soviet scholars present an interesting contrast. Since the beginning of the 1(C)1 Council/Academy exchange in the social sciences and humanities, the average length of stay in the host country has been increasing for Canadian scholars and decreasing for

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[44] Of the nine Soviet professors who came to Carleton under the exchange with Leningrad, four were in science (mathematics, chemistry and geology), with the rest in literature, philosophy, geography and economics.

the Soviets. In the first year, 1974-75, the two Russian candidates each stayed four months. The five Canadian candidates averaged six weeks. In the current year, the projected figure is approximately one month for each Soviet scholar, and two months for each Canadian. Overall, the average length of stay through the five years of the 1(C)1 program is six weeks for the Soviets and two months for the Canadians. Figures for the 1(D)1 exchange show a reverse trend. The average length of stay in the host country has been decreasing for Canadian scholars and increasing for the Soviets. In the first year, 1972-73, the two Russian candidates each stayed four months, as did the two Canadian scholars. In the current year, the figure is four and one-half months for each Soviet scholar, and only one month for each Canadian. Overall, the average length of stay through the seven years of the 1(D)1 program is three months for the Soviets and seven weeks for the Canadians.

Thus under both 1(C)1 and 1(D)1, the average length of stay for Canadian candidates in the USSR has been approximately the same - seven to eight weeks. Soviet candidates, on the other hand, have spent on the average twice as much time in Canada under 1(D)1 as they have under the Academy/Council agreement - three months as opposed to six weeks. Travel patterns also vary. Virtually all Soviet 1(C)1 visitors spend major portions of their stay in at least three Canadian cities; two-thirds visit at least four; and over one-fourth visit five or more. The recent six-week tour of a senior Academy official brought him to ten cities. In contrast, 84% of Soviet 1(D)1 candidates spend most of their time in just one place, with a quick Komandirovka in the last week or two of their term to other universities. The significant differences in duration of stay and in travel patterns are again related to differences in choice of discipline. Most of the Soviet 1(D)1 candidates were engineers or scientists who preferred to settle in at one institution for as long as possible and carry out a laboratory project that would net publishable results. Soviet researchers in the social sciences generally prefer a shorter term period of broad familiarization with as many Canadian facilities as possible, and meetings with the numerous individuals in universities or government agencies who are doing the work in their fields. Thus the one Soviet historian who came to Canada under the 1(D)1 exchange emulated the 1(C)1 pattern, dividing his four months in 1977-78 between the Universities of British Columbia, Calgary, Toronto, Carleton and McGill.

The variation in the work patterns of Soviet 1(C)1 and 1(D)1 scholars means a difference in the cost of the two programs. Extensive travel is expensive, although the shorter duration of a 1(C)1 stay restores some balance. The Academy official's ten-city, six-week tour in 1978-79 cost the Council over $3,500 for his stipend, hotel accommodation and internal transportation. A similar amount would cover a four-month stipend and apartment costs for a Soviet

1(D)1 candidate in the sciences. However, internal travel is an unreciprocal aspect of the Council/Academy exchange. Clause 1(C)1 permits all travel which is "in accordance with the work program approved by the receiving side," but the Soviets have been able to use the provision to greater advantage. All Soviet 1(C)1 candidates stop in at least three Canadian cities, but 40% of Canadian candidates have only one destination in the Soviet Union, and 50% have only two. The remaining 10% stop in three, or never more than four places. Two-thirds of Soviet visitors stop in at least four places, and over one-fourth visit five or more. The reason for the imbalance lies partly in the fact that fewer Canadians are interested in the sort of academic touring which is so attractive to the Russians. Canadian itineraries tend to be oriented toward research in libraries and archives which are grouped in one or two cities. It is true that Canadians would travel more if they were accepted at every institution to which they apply, but generally speaking, most prefer in-depth study at a limited number of centres.

Fifty percent of Canadian candidates on the 1(D)1 exchange stop in just one city. They have not used the provision for a Komandirovka, as have their Soviet counterparts. Like 1(C)1 scholars, the majority of those who go under clause 1(D)1 visit one or two places in the USSR, with only 13% stopping in three or four. Since Canadians on both the 1(C)1 and 1(D)1 exchange are virtually all in fields of the social sciences or the humanities, there is little variation in either length of stay or travel patterns. The most popular spot on itineraries is Moscow. Of the 52 Canadians who have worked in the Soviet Union under both programs, only four have chosen Leningrad instead. Of those who travelled to more than one city, most went to both Russian centres. Eight Canadian professors visited Tbilisi in Georgia, and five went to Kiev in the Ukraine. Two have travelled to Central Asia, and institutions in Smolensk, Erivan, Odessa, L'vov, and Novosibirsk have each hosted one Canadian on an Academy or MINVUZ senior exchange. An art historian who, at the time of writing, was in the USSR under clause 1(D)1 described her research itinerary as architectural field work in the Trans-Onega lake district and "Golden Ring" around Moscow.

1(C)1 & 1(D)1 Sex, Age and Academic Rank

Women represent a very small proportion of the senior scholars on both sides of the 1(C)1 and 1(D)1 programs. The USSR sends a much larger number of female candidates under senior exchanges than under junior, but overall, only two (5%) of the Soviet 1(D)1 scholars and seven (20%) of the 1(C)1 candidates are women. The numbers and percentages on the Canadian side are even smaller, reflecting a characteristic of Canadian academic society in general. Close to 50% of the Canadian candidates on the 1(D)2 student exchange are women, but the two faculty programs have each supported only two females. These four women together comprise just 7.7% of the Canadian participants on the Academy and MINVUZ senior exchanges.

One of the Canadian women was also, at 29, the youngest scholar sent by either side. The oldest candidate was a Canadian too. In 1977-78 this scholar spent three productive months in Moscow and Leningrad, at the age of 62, on the Academy exchange. Soviet 1(C)1 candidates have ranged in age from 30 to 55, and the 1(D)1 scholars from 34 to 58. The variation is less extreme but on the whole, Soviet scholars on both the 1(C)1 and 1(D)1 programs are significantly older than their Canadian counterparts. As the following table shows, both countries have the same number of candidates in the upper third of the range. Otherwise, the difference is striking.

Table 12

1(C)1 and 1(D)1 Candidates

Birth cohort	Soviet	Canadian
1914-1924	9 (12%)	9 (18%)
1925-1934	38 (53%)	14 (27%)
1935-1947	25 (35%)	28 (55%)
Totals	72(100%)	51(100%)*

*There are 52 candidates but the age of one 1(D)1 scholar was missing from his file.

Looking at just the Council/Academy exchange, the contrast is even more dramatic.

Table 13

1(C)1 Candidates

Birth cohort	Soviet	Canadian
1915-1924	6 (18%)	5 (18%)
1925-1934	17 (50%)	5 (18%)
1935-1947	11 (32%)	18 (64%)
Totals	34(100%)	28(100%)

The differences probably reflect not only the Soviet tendency to send abroad the more mature scholar, but also the impact of the postwar decade on the development of Soviet Studies. Those who were born between 1925 and 1934 would have entered graduate school at the peak of the cold war. Hence it is scarcely surprising that only 18% of Canadian 1(C)1 candidates fall into that age range. Conversely, those who were born after 1935 would have entered graduate school after 1955, the date which marks the beginning of the thaw, and the gradual onset of programs permitting westerners to study in the USSR.

A comparison based on professional ranking is less objective than one based on birthdates because of differences in the two academic systems. On their data sheets, a majority of Soviet candidates answer the question on academic title with the term "senior scientific researcher." Other criteria (age, publication record), suggest that this status represents a middle rank, roughly equivalent to that of associate professor. Excluding Russian specialists in law and medicine from the base calculation, the following table shows that 85% (or 29/34) of Soviet professors on the 1(D)1 exchange are of middle or upper rank - 35% associate professors or "senior scientific researchers" and 50% with full professor status. Only 25% of Canadian 1(D)1 professors hold the latter rank, with 42% possessing associate status. The remaining one-third of Canadian candidates could have fit, by rank and age, into the 1(D)2 exchange of junior scholars.

Table 14

	Soviet		Canadian	
	1(C)1	1(D)1	1(C)1	1(D)1
Academy officials	9	-	-	-
Professors	5	17	6	6
Associate professors	20	12	16	10
Assistant professors	-	5	5	7
Specialists	-	4	1	1
Totals	34	38	28	24

In contrast, both sides appear to be exchanging approximately the same percentage of scholars at the middle and upper academic levels under the 1(C)1 Council/Academy program. Sixteen associate professors - 57% of the Canadians, and twenty "senior [social] scientific workers" - 59% of the Soviets, have participated in the Council/Academy exchange. Similarly, Canada has sent six full professors, compared with five Soviets of the same rank.

The remainder of Soviet 1(C)1 candidates are, as Table 14 indicates, senior officials from the Academy of Sciences or one of its affiliated institutes. Although the exchange is supposedly limited to "specialists" who can conduct research and give lectures, perhaps only three or four of these officials could also be classified as scholars. The files suggest that the others are bureaucrats in academic guise who have used the 1(C)1 program as a vehicle to exchange views with Canadian counterparts and, generally, to familiarize themselves with Canada. Two-week visits during the 1976-77 program by two Academy officials seem to lie within this category. In some cases, a trip to Canada may also be perceived by the Russians as a "perk" of position. The two trips by another senior Academician could be regarded in this fashion. There is evidence that the exchange of a few 1(D)1

professors in various scientific fields similarly fits in a "reward" category. Retirement age in the USSR is 60, and Canadian university scientists occasionally report that they have hosted senior Soviet candidates in their late 50s, who were not interested in doing joint research. Such men typically had long teaching careers behind them (rather than an impressive list of publications), and were using the trip to Canada as a time for reading, attending conferences and touring about, instead of working in a laboratory.

1(C)1 & 1(D)1 Language Competence

Of the 72 Soviet candidates who have come to Canada under the two senior exchange programs, 8% claimed French fluency, 5½% asserted a capability in both languages, and all the rest declared a good knowledge of English. As in the case of the young scholars, comments from hosts suggest that some of these self-ratings were exaggerated. There appears to have been more initial difficulty with language among the junior candidates than among the senior, but perhaps 20% of the 1(D)1 scientists and an almost equal number of Soviet social scientists had some communication problem. A letter from the Canada Council to the Academy of Sciences, reviewing the first three years of the exchange, observed that individual data sheets should be more "specific" about the extent of language competence. "It has been found that while scholars may have sufficient knowledge for social conversation, they will require interpreters to carry out a scholarly exchange of views with Canadian colleagues."45

Of the 52 Canadian candidates in the 1(C)1 and 1(D)1 programs, 23% admitted to minimal or no competence in Russian. A few could speak another Soviet or East European language instead of Russian; several others knew Russian and Polish, or Ukrainian, Georgian, Lithuanian or Belorussian. A McGill librarian on the 1(C)1 exchange was a specialist in the Central Asian language of Tajik. A Toronto professor of Islamic Studies, who travelled to Soviet Central Asia under clause 1(D)1, knew the Uzbek and Turkmen languages. For Canadians, the inability to speak or read Russian appears to be a minor handicap, troublesome primarily when a candidate is not met at his destination, or is left to find his own way around under other cirumstances. For scholarly exchange, interpreters are much more generally available in the USSR than they are in Canada. The experience of some Canadian professors attests to the fact that in a number of fields there is no necessary correlation between a command of Russian and scholarly success. One Canadian participant, whose speciality is French literature, spent three months in Moscow and

45Letter to G.K. Scriabin, Chief Scientific Secretary, Academy of Sciences, from Frank Milligan, Canada Council, 16 August 1977.

Leningrad during 1976-77 on the Council/Academy exchange. Although he is not competent in Russian, he reported a highly satisfactory stay from both a personal and professional standpoint. The Russians, for the first time on record, permitted him to photocopy 4,000 frames of the official correspondence and papers of Catherine II, a coup which provides a "trove of unparalleled interest for historians the world over."[46] Similarly, a 1(C)1 scholar in 1978-79 was able to communicate effectively without knowledge of Russian: a Sinologist from a western university, he employed Chinese and English to talk with Soviet colleagues at the Oriental and Far Eastern Institutes in Moscow.

1(C)1 & 1(D)1 Fields of Study

As in the case of the 1(D)2 program for junior scholars, some officials see the differences in choice of discipline among Canadian and Soviet 1(D)1 professors as an unreciprocal aspect of the senior exchange. Only one Canadian scientist has ever participated in the 1(D)1 program, compared with 84% (32/38) in the Soviet case. The candidate in question, a Carleton professor of chemistry who spent three weeks happily touring laboratories and giving lectures at Moscow and Leningrad, was clearly the rare exception to a general rule: the needs of senior Canadian scientists are well taken care of under the NRC/Academy exchange. Close to 95% of all basic scientific work in the USSR takes place not in universities, but in research institutes that are affiliated with the Academy of Sciences. Thus the dozen or more Canadian scientists who wish to spend a month or two in the Soviet Union in any given year are not likely to apply under clause 1(D)1. On the other hand, Soviet universities control libraries and other resources which are important to the interested community of social scientists and humanists. Canadian scholars in Slavic languages, literature, history, geography, political science and other such fields need channels permitting access to both Soviet universities and the Academy of Sciences.

In the program for 1978-79, a new phrase was inserted within clause 1(D)1, encouraging both sides "to achieve a more balanced representation of the participants in these exchanges . . . ." However, just as Canadian officials are not going to attract 1(D)1 candidates in the pure or applied sciences, the Soviets are not likely to change their basic direction. Over the seven years of the 1(D)1 program, the USSR has sent six social scientists - in law, geography, political science, economics (2), and history. Almost 38% of the rest were in engineering (compared with 50% of Soviet 1(D)2 students), with the remaining twenty professors in physics (4), chemistry (3), mining

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[46]Memorandum from External Affairs to SSHRC, 1 May 1978.

geology and metallurgical science (3), computer science (2), mathematics (2), botany (2), forestry (1) and medicine (3). Soviet interest in academic exchange with western countries is always centred, overwhelmingly, on science and technology. This fact is reflected not only in the fields of study chosen by Soviet candidates under clauses 1(D)1 and 1(D)2, but is also often apparent in the topics chosen by Soviet economists, psychologists (e.g. industrial relations), and even historians (e.g. development of technology in Canada), under 1(C)1 Council/Academy exchange.

The largest number of Soviet participants in the 1(C)1 program have been in the field of economics. Canada has not sent a single economist to the USSR under any clause of the General Exchanges Agreement. In contrast, 36% of Soviet applicants in the social sciences cite economics as their area of study. The next largest fields of interest are history with 30%, and psychology, with almost 20%. (With one exception, the scholars in the latter field all came to Canada in 1977-78, primarily to attend the social psychology conference at Carleton.) The Soviets have also sent, or are planning to send, three experts in the field of law, two in sociology, one in linguistics and two in computer science. Two men who were nominally economists also appear, on close examination, to have been computer specialists. As authors of works of information retrieval systems and on mathematical modelling in the oil industry, they sought Canadian expertise in building simulated and prognostic energy models. Their four-week visits were hosted by eight universities, the Alberta Engergy Resources Conservation Board, the National Energy Board, Canadian Energy Research Institute, Geological Survey and other federal agencies. Since computer science is a border area of scientific/social scientific concern, some aspects are considered appropriate for the Council/Academy exchange. The Soviets' interest in this area, nevertheless, is a reflection of their general technological orientation.

There are no significant differences in the fields of study chosen by senior Canadian candidates under the 1(C)1 or 1(D)1 exchanges. Forty percent of the former (11/28), and 30 percent of the latter (7/24), have been professors in the field of Slavic literature, language or linguistics. Combining the two exchanges, the next largest areas of study are history (6), political science (5), psychology and the history of psychiatry (4), geography (3), philosophy (2), law (2) and French literature (2). One candidate in the field of archeology, one in urban sociology, and one in Persian and Tajik literature have travelled to the USSR (or are planning to leave in 1979-80) under clause 1(C)1. Under 1(D)1, Canada has sent an art historian, and one specialist in each of these fields: Islamic studies, theatre, fine arts and education.

1(C)1 & 1(D)1 Candidate Evaluation

The imbalance in the ratio of social scientists and humanists to scientists and engineers under clause 1(D)1 is a structural imbalance, created not only by varying academic interests in each country but by basic differences in institutional organization. Thus the policy focus should be less on trying to attain a better representation of fields, and more on setting strategies so each side can obtain the best out of the exchange. Until the current year, the USSR appeared to be doing rather better than Canada. Certainly the Soviets have the advantage in numbers and man-months. Before the imposition of strict reciprocity in 1978, Canadian officials had refused less than 3% of all Soviet 1(D)1 nominations, yet tolerated a 32% rejection rate of their own candidates. Moreover, of those Canadians who were placed, at least one-third encountered serious obstacles in carrying out their research. Of the 23* candidates who spent a month or more in the Soviet Union under clause 1(D)1, 75% wrote final reports. Two of these were entirely negative; five described numerous problems but also considerable success; and ten reported a generally satisfactory stay.

The first of the two completely negative reports was filed by a professor at the Université de Montréal. Arriving in Erivan, Armenia, in May 1975 for a projected two-month stay, he found no one to meet him and no one who even knew of his impending arrival. Local officials were sympathetic but without an authorization from MINVUZ they could not give him his stipend. For ten days the Armenians paid his hotel accommodation, and allowed him to work in the library while he waited for help from the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. However, the letter he had written apparently did not reach the embassy, and he was unable to contact them by phone. Since he was running out of rubles, he decided he had no choice but to leave. "Je vous assure," he wrote the Council, "que le climat, l'accueil, l'intérêt du travail entrepris étaient tels qu'il a bien fallu un cas de force majeure pour me faire prendre cette decision." Nevertheless, he also felt as a Canadian citizen, ". . . humilié qu'un autre pays puisse traiter le Canada avec une pareille désinvolture. Je ne sais pas encore s'il s'agit de mauvais vouloir ou d'incurie de la part des autorités adverses; il faut les avoir vu fonctionner pour jauger l'inertie et la complication paperassières de cette administration."[47] In a subsequent letter, the

*The 24th candidate had to leave one week after arriving because of family illness.

47Letter to the Canada Council, 6 June 1975.

professor told External Affairs that on reflection, he had decided his experience was more a question of administrative muddling than of bad faith or ill will.[48] The second candidate to suffer a disturbing experience arrived at a different interpretation. A humanist from McGill told the Canada Council that he had endured petty harassment, and that obstacles were deliberately created to prevent him from seeing the people he wanted to meet. Based on his three weeks in the USSR in April-May 1976, he could only conclude that the exchange "seems an almost total waste of time and money. I therefore recommend that it be suspended forthwith . . . ."[49]

This professor's itinerary had been drawn up in consultation with local and visiting Russian scholars. It included the names of 16 institutes and 27 individuals in Leningrad, Moscow and Tartu. Upon hearing from the Canada Council that his proposal had been accepted, he "naturally assumed" that it included all these institutes and persons, although his visa (issued three days after his intended date of departure) bore only the names of Leningrad University and the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education. Eventually, he was allowed to see only five scholars - all of them at Leningrad. In retrospect, it is clear that MINVUZ was not able to get access to the Academy-affiliated researchers and institutes he wished to visit, and that he was also the victim of incompetence and of a very unhelpful attitude on the part of bureaucrarts in Inotdel, the Foreign Department at Leningrad University. It also seems clear that he should not have been nominated under 1(D)1 in the first place. His research plan was oriented not to in-depth study at a library or other university facility, but to establishing new scholarly contacts in keeping with his duties as president of an international learned society. Since most of the people and places he sought were linked to the Academy of Sciences, it appears that he should have been nominated under 1(C)1. He also should not have been allowed to leave without firm assurances from MINVUZ, or without knowing what not to expect. The proviso that notification of placement must state in writing the institutions where the candidate has been accepted was negotiated during the November 1975 Mixed Commission meeting, but did not come into effect until 1976-77. Nevertheless, this scholar should have been counselled against making any "natural assumption" when dealing with MINVUZ.

This case is the worst example of an access problem under clause 1(D)1, but there are other instances of Canadian professors not being able to accomplish all that they had set out to do because they are

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[48]Letter to the Cultural Affairs Directorate, External Affairs, 3 February 1977.

[49]Final Report to the Canada Council, 19 July 1976.

denied entry to facilities under Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Archives, or other non-MINVUZ jurisdictions. If the scholar is aware before departure exactly what he can or cannot expect in terms of access, then the impact of the denial is at least psychologically diminished. Occasionally, there are other benefits. A professor of Russian literature at a Prairie university was a 1(D)1 candidate in 1977-78. Given entry to a number of archives and institutes in Moscow and Leningrad, he asked the Council for clarification on the status of three for which there had been no answer. The clarification was never received but this professor left for Moscow prepared for a battle which "surprisingly and fortunately [he] won - much to the astonishment of everyone, so much so that Ambassador Ford felt obliged to write a note of appreciation to the appropriate authority . . . ."[50]

Most of the 1(D)1 participants who filed a final report describe similarly satisfying experiences. Even those who were unable to get a restriction lifted, or who otherwise suffered bureaucratic hassles and delays, seemed to regard the overall experience as generally worthwhile. Access to a few important collections, or a period of successful work in only some of the material requested, tends to mute scholarly complaint. In any case, over half of those reporting described no serious problems. One professor of Russian referred to "cooperative and helpful" officials at MINVUZ and to a period of research so rewarding he was able to leave two weeks earlier than anticipated.[51] In 1975, the director of a research centre in Alberta thanked the Council and External Affairs for "a unique opportunity to learn about the theory and practice of psychology in the Soviet Union."[52] A University of Ottawa law professor in the same year considered his research visit "extremely fruitful." He had strengthened professional relations with Soviet lawyers he had known previously and made many new contacts. He was able to obtain out-of-print books and to get photocopies of otherwise unavailable texts. He was also able to see "law in action," in criminal and civil courts and foreign trade arbitration litigation.[53] A Toronto professor of Islamic Studies praised the exchange as making it "possible for me to locate, examine and in some cases microfilm quite a number of old manuscripts which all my previous written requests had utterly failed

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[50]Letter to SSHRC, 7 May 1979.

[51]Letter to the Canada Council, 25 March 1976. As a student, this scholar had also participated in the University of Toronto exchange.

[52]Letter to the Canada Council, 12 December 1975.

[53]Report dated 11 August 1975.

to achieve."[54] A number of 1(D)1 participants in different fields commented further that the trip to the Soviet Union had not only illumined areas of their research, but enriched their teaching as well.

Of the 18 Canadians who travelled to the USSR from 1974-1978 on the 1(C)1 Canada Council/Academy of Sciences exchange, 16 filed a final report. Fully half of these accounts, plus two more from part of the 1978-79 contingent, described a pleasant, stimulating and successful stay in the USSR. No 1(C)1 scholar appears to have suffered an entirely negative experience but eight again describe serious difficulties of archival access or limitations on travel. Like their 1(D)1 counterparts, each felt that despite the obstacles, the trip had presented a useful and even profitable experience. One candidate in the first year of the exchange wrote, for instance, that he had not been granted permission to visit L'vov, and had been given too little time at the Institute of Linguistics in Kiev, yet at the Institute of Russian Language in Moscow - where she spent four weeks - "everyone was most cooperative . . . I received permission to work at Lenin's Library, and in the Manuscripts and Rare Books Division . . . ." There is "room for improvement," she added, but overall the exchange was "very worthwhile."[55] Another scholar commented in March 1978, that despite the severe curtailment of her research program at an institute in Novosibirsk, she still counted the experience as "memorable and profitable."[56] A third, who had been denied access to all materials at the Arctic Institute in February 1976 wrote: "Dans l'ensemble, je suis assez satisfait de mon voyage même si je n'y ai pas recueilli le minimum de renseignements auxquels je m'attendais."[57]

Canadians on both senior exchange programs rarely complain about hotel accommodation, food quality or the sufficiency of their 12 ruble daily allowance. The latter provisions are generally deemed adequate. Various bureaucratic snags (MINVUZ or Academy failure to meet a candidate at the airport, a delay in issuing the necessary visa for internal travel), besides archival and travel restrictions, are the problems more commonly cited. Most of the difficulties, whether of major or minor import, are blamed on the unwieldy nature of Soviet officialdom. It is somewhat easier to deal with the Academy's

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[54]Report dated 5 July 1974.

[55]Letter to the Canada Council, 23 September 1974.

[56]Letter to the Canada Council, 14 March 1978.

[57]Letter to the Canadian Embassy (with copy to Canada Council), 8 March 1976.

bureaucracy than it is to cope with MINVUZ or, especially, with the foreign department of a Soviet university (Inotdel), but even the most experienced candidates will encounter some frustrations. A Calgary professor - a 1(D)1 participant in the first year of the exchange and again in 1977-78 - wrote that he "forgot" how slowly things move in the USSR. "What I can accomplish [in Canada] in one day will take five days there because of the bureaucracy."[58] Scholars on both senior exchanges almost all testify, however, that once they surmount the obstacles posed by this notoriously clumsy and inefficient system - once they are at work in institutes, libraries and archives - they are generally permitted to see and photocopy all pertinent materials and to engage in precisely the sort of scholar-to-scholar exchange which the program was designed to facilitate. Even the humanist who had the worst problems with access conceded that the individual Russian scholars he managed to meet were cordial and helpful "and some sufficiently interesting that temporarily at least one could forget the constant harassment of officials . . . ." In sum, virtually all participants feel that despite shortcomings, the senior exchange programs provide the interested community with a valuable scholarly opportunity.

Scholars feel, moreover, that some of the problems are not incapable of resolution and that other difficulties could be ameliorated by better Canadian coordinating procedures. Candidates note that not all delays and mix-ups are necessarily the fault of the Soviet side. Not infrequently, the Canadian Embassy fails to learn of a candidate's arrival or other problems are created because notifications and requests are lost in channels. At the top of any priority list, however, is the preparation of a briefing book for professors. Canadian students have had the benefit of a handbook (however outdated) since the second year of the exchange, but Canadian professors have not. A 1(C)1 candidate in 1977-78 informed the Council that the "inadequacies" of her preparation were just too numerous to list: ". . . immediately upon arrival when I was not met, I found that I was ill-prepared to cope with even the simplest aspect of living in the Soviet Union . . . . The most useful information obtained prior to arriving . . . was from the RCMP in Edmonton."[59] A 1(C)1 candidate in 1978-79 wrote that if SSHRC "precursors had been doing their job properly, they would not only have passed on the requisite knowledge to [the present staff], but would have made it available for participants . . . ."[60]

58Final report to the Canada Council, 17 July 1978.

59Final report to the Canada Council, 14 March 1978.

60Final report to SSHRC, 17 April 1979.

A handbook would save researchers a considerable loss of time and aggravation by simply stating exactly what a Canadian on a 1(C)1 or a 1(D)1 exchange may expect from the Academy or MINVUZ free of charge, and what may be allowed at the professor's own expense. Embassy views would be vital in drafting such advice, for it is also important to know what consular staff can or cannot provide. Scholars agree that the book should include all the trivia - the mundane details of whether to fly Air Canada or Aeroflot; how to get through Customs; what to do if you are not met at the airport; locations (and special spousal rates) of the university, Academy and other hotels; how to use the transportation system; and advice on the best places to eat. A handbook should also include the names and telephone numbers of officials in the foreign departments of MINVUZ and the Academy, as well as the Canadian Embassy's number. (Telephone directories are not readily available in Moscow.) A calendar of Soviet holidays might also be included, so that itineraries can be planned around May Day, International Women's Day and other such celebrations. The book could also include the working hours of Soviet institutes and universities, and offer a variety of advice on major and minor matters. In the latter category, candidates could be told how to use the service desks at their hotels, and warned to go armed with ten or twenty passport photos for passes, exit visas, applications and numerous other forms. In the former category - according to experienced candidates - scholars should be advised how to push, and push fast, when they are denied access to a research institute or archive.

The lack of a handbook is perhaps a reflection of the fact that the students' program and the professors' programs have been administered by two different agencies. It also reflects the absence of academic influence on policy. The need for some sort of briefing system, whereby a researcher might understand exactly what to expect from Soviet authorities, had long been cited by participants in submission of their final reports. Several noted the US provision of such information for their exchanges. But without a mechanism for regular, qualitative evaluation of the exchange, such comments were buried in candidate files. Similarly, the views expressed by 1(D)1 hosts were examined, discussed and occasionally disseminated among other interested policy-makers (particularly before a scheduled Mixed Commission meeting), but little effort was made to accumulate and correlate such data with an eye to the formulation of more effective policy.

1(D)1 Host Evaluation

Since 84% of all Soviet 1(D)1 senior scholars are scientists or engineers, host problems largely parallel those encountered on the 1(D)2 junior exchange, where scientists and engineers make up 95% of the Soviet contingent. The difficulties posed by the demands on host

time, by unanticipated restrictions and expenses, indirect research costs, mismatched laboratory interests and other burdens have been discussed at length in the section on young scholars. Two other complaints are unique to the senior program. One variation between 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 candidates is the difference in age. The maturity of a senior scholar often works to a host's advantage. His guest is more likely to make a worthwhile contribution to a research project than is a junior nominee. On the other hand, as noted in the analysis of senior scholar birth dates, a Soviet professor who is over 55 may simply be enjoying a trip to Canada as a reward for long service and not want to do any joint research. For example, a professor of petroleum engineering who visited Alberta reported participation in petroleum production seminars, familiarization with undergraduate teaching methods, travel to oil fields, tar sand installations and other university laboratories.[61] His host thought him an agreeable fellow, but would have preferred to receive a research scientist.[62]

The second major difference between the 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 programs is the length of time permitted in the host country. A number of Canadian scientists complained that the five-month maximum (compared with 10 months for a junior scholar), is just not enough for some fields for the completion of a research project. A chemistry professor at UBC, for example, noted that he and his industrious, knowledgeable Soviet colleague had trouble finishing their work this year, because equipment failures and delays in the receipt of chemical compounds used up too much time. Others observe that the short four to five-month period makes it absolutely essential that the interests of a Soviet researcher fit within an existing project. Besides the question of money for additional equipment, there is rarely time to start anything new.

As in the case of the 1(D)2 junior scholars, Soviet candidates were asked to file a final report, but their Canadian hosts were not. For both programs, recent interviews improved the known/unknown ratio, but there is still no information from hosts on approximately 40% of Soviet 1(D)1 scholars, especially those who participated in the first years of the exchange. For the remaining 60% of senior researchers, two-thirds received favourable judgments. Of the rest, three hosts described an entirely negative experience, with the remainder of opinion falling into the broad category of "numerous difficulties involved, but on the whole a useful encounter." One of the three negative judgments centred on a 1(D)1 candidate in the current year who was "pleasant, friendly and not difficult to work with," but who

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61A report to Canada Council, January 1978.

62Interview, 8 May 1979.

needed another four months to complete his research, who had a poor command of English, who cost his supervisor $2,000 in university and NRC grant monies for equipment, and who also incurred bills of over $500 for micofiche and photocopies of library material. His host suggested to the SSHRC that in light of the burdens, "the benefits of these visits [should] be reassessed." Western engineers had long ago discarded the candidate's line of research as "unfruitful." The best the host could hope for from their joint project was a paper showing "just how unfruitful it is."

> The primary benefit to me will be a friend in Moscow should I be able to afford to visit Russia . . . . I do not think this personal benefit is of much significance to Canada as a whole. I shall certainly decline to take on any more visitors from Russia unless adequate arrangements are made to cover the many costs to the University and its faculty and staff, and to provide additional administrative help for arranging travel, etc. In addition, some effective advance preparation . . . should be provided to help to ensure that a useful program of research is carried out.[63]

These remarks echo the lament of 1(D)2 exchange hosts in those cases where tightened university budgets have meant the loss of more than manpower. The comment also points again to the importance of integrating a Soviet researcher into an ongoing project, and of asking the Soviets for more detailed information. As the host noted, "had we been able to discuss, by mail, the work which he would undertake when he arrived, we could have defined a more useful research program . . . ." The case further illustrates the need for better communication between SSHRC and the host. The letter thanking Carleton for accepting a Soviet 1(D)1 researcher clearly specified that "expenses related to the research project of the Soviet visitor, i.e. printing, photocopying, computer time, etc. are not paid by the Council."[64] However, since the letter was addressed not to the eventual host, but to the original contact in his department, it is probable that the host was unaware of the restriction.

Other scientists, in pleasing contrast to this one, reported different encounters. A departmental chairman in a western university in 1975 wrote on behalf of his Department, the Faculty of Science and the university, to tell the Canada Council how greatly they

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[63]Letter to SSHRC, 5 April 1979.

[64]Letter from SSHRC, 31 July 1978.

appreciated the opportunity to host a Soviet professor from the University of Tartu.

> [The visitor] . . . was a delightful and informative guest, who gave generously of his time from a very busy schedule to deliver a number of formal lectures and to take part in many informal discussions and field trips. He assured us that his trips to the Arctic, the Rocky Mountains, and to the environs of Edmonton, plus the opportunity to consult with staff members, use our herbaria, and use the University's and staff members' libraries, etc., had been of immense value to him . . . [The] university coordinator of the visit has nothing but praise for the splendid cooperation and assistance that you . . . provided to him and to [the visitor] . . . . We hope that we may have the privilege and pleasure of participating in other scientific exchanges arranged under the auspices of the Canada Council in the future.[65]

Most other evaluations fall between the two extremes. A mining engineer at the École Polytechnique in Montreal wrote to say that his responsibilities as host "occupied an unexpected amount of time and effort," but that his guest "personally deserved this attention."[66] Experience with the handful of Soviet social scientists who travelled to Canada under clause 1(D)1 shows similar variation. One economist was regarded by his host as an "excellent researcher" who was "very fluent" in English and "exceptionally industrious and organized in his work."[67] Students at the University of Alberta reacted positively to lectures from another - a Soviet political scientist. "Most said they profited from hearing a representative of the Soviet Union . . . present his views," and faculty members "found the exchange interesting," although there were no "freewheeling" discussions because the candidate was "not fluent enough to detect nuances and overtones."[68]

One encounter with a Russian social scientist was entirely negative. The story is worth recounting in some detail, for it illustrates the way in which administrative mix-ups can undermine the

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[65]Letter to Canada Council, 3 December 1975.

[66]Letter to Canada Council, 8 February 1978.

[67]Letter to Canada Council, 27 October 1977.

[68]Letter to Canada Council, 10 December 1975.

potential value of an exchange, and also the cultural and political barriers which are sometimes difficult to surmount. In the fall of 1976, the Faculty of Law at an Ontario university welcomed a "distinguished" professor who had arrived rather unexpectedly. No one had met him at Mirabel, but despite his limited spoken English, he was able to find his way to his destination by train. In an envelope with various other documents waiting for him, the Canada Council had somehow included a telex from the Canadian Embassy in Moscow noting some problems over MINVUZ refusal of Canada 1(D)1 candidates. The visitor "concluded - and seems unshakeable in his belief - that this memo was intentionally inserted to warn him that he would be treated badly in retaliation . . . ." These slip-ups coloured every aspect of his stay. There are no apartment hotels in the city he visited and the university had been unable to find a place with kitchen facilities for a short-term (3½ months) visit. Comparing his housing with that of two long-term Soviet 1(D)2 students, the 1(D)1 scholar concluded that the Canadians were deliberately discriminating against him. His area of research, state-owned or controlled corporations, is not a highly developed field of study in Canada, so he also came to feel that the university was "hiding something from him. He simply cannot accept our categories of knowledge in the discipline . . . . He has somehow concluded as well that our library facilities are inferior and that he cannot find what he wants in them." To assist him, the law faculty hired a research assistant with a graduate law degree from Oxford, a "superior student" enrolled to obtain the LLB qualification for practice in Ontario. Unfortunately, the visiting scholar viewed this assistance "somewhat suspiciously, as being beneath the dignity of a specialist who should speak only to other specialists in his field." He asked for a transfer to another university and the Dean of Law was happy to oblige since all were "somewhat disheartened" to see their efforts "go for naught." Before his departure, however, the visitor did come "to realize that he had misinterpreted a number of events . . . and to appreciate both the difficulties of the subject he had undertaken to research and the limitations posed by his lack of proficiency in the English language."[69] In his final two weeks at the original university, relations improved greatly and ended on a very cordial note.

1(C)1 Host Evaluation

None of the scholars hosting Soviet social scientists under the 1(C)1 exchange with the Academy of Sciences encountered anything quite like this episode, but a number of negative judgments did centre on Canada Council operating procedures. As in the case of the 1(D)1 and 1(D)2

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[69]Letters to the Canada Council, 9 September, 18 October, 1 November 1976.

programs, administrators never developed a regular mechanism for evaluation of the 1(C)1 exchange, thus the Council has received follow-up reports on host experience with only half the Soviet participants. Of these, 55% have been favourable, although the overall ratio of good accounts might be higher. Again, as in the case of the 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 programs, those who have problems with Soviet candidates are more likely to tell the Council about it than are those who have enjoyed an exchange.

Most of the unfavourable comment falls into the broad range of "difficulties encountered but not an entirely unsatisfactory experience." The only candidates to merit completely negative evaluations were two officials from the Academy's Institute of US and Canadian Studies. One of these toured Canada for three weeks in 1975-76. Nominally an economist, he sounded more like an engineer to the Canadians he met. Repeatedly altering his itinerary at whim, without sound academic reason and to no scholarly advantage, his behaviour eventually provoked a formal complaint to the Academy. Another Institute official was apparently more pleasant and cooperative, but his trip to Canada in the first year of the 1(C)1 exchange aroused a similar reaction. Given his status, Canadians organized an extensive series of meetings and consultations with federal and provincial government officials, and with members of the business and academic communities, in almost every major city from Halifax to Vancouver. The following comment from an economics professor at the University of British Columbia, who served as one of the hosts, was representative:

> [His] visit was disastrous: he was not an economist as alleged (or a scholar of any kind, as far as I could tell). But before he arrived I had arranged interviews, at his request, with the Premier, the Minister of Economic Development, the President of Simon Fraser University, and several other important people, as well as a joint seminar for him and other arrangements. I was very embarrassed . . . and rather annoyed that I had been called on for so much time and effort . . . .[70]

This latter case further illustrates the very real disadvantges in not having established a cumulative information and evaluation system. In 1978-79, the same official made a second extensive (and very expensive) trip to Canada - a six-week, ten-city tour. Had the Canada Council's successors known that he had been here previously, they

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70Letter to Canada Council, 14 November 1977.

might have placed some limitations on his travel. Even had they been aware, however, they probably would have had some difficulty collating the earlier judgments. His 1974-75 candidate file had been sent to Public Archives, and the comment quoted above was buried in the documentation on the 1977-78 exchange. The remarks about him happened to be contained within a letter that set out to evaluate two later 1(C)1 candidates.

Given official unhappiness with the ratio of Soviet scientists and engineers to social scientists in the 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 exchanges, it is perhaps ironic that the 1(C)1 Council/Academy exchange of social scientists and humanists has provoked a higher percentage of host complaints. There are now evaluations for over 70% of the 1(D)2 junior candidates, and 60% of the 1(D)1 senior scholars. Approximately one-third of this known opinion falls within the range of negative judgment. The available data for 50% of the 1(C)1 candidates shows, on the other hand, almost half the opinion in the unfavourable range. Except in a few instances, as in the two cases just described, host complaints are mostly directed not to the academic deficiences, or other characteristics and behaviour of Soviet participants, but to the organizational, coordinative and administrative procedures which are the responsibility of the Council.

One of the serious and persistent laments centres on an apparent difficulty in determining, well in advance, the actual research needs of an individual Soviet scholar. In some instances, the difficulty is related - as in the case of 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 - both to an insufficiency of information on the Soviet side and to the Canada Council's lack of familiarity with the more technologically-oriented fields. For example, two 1(C)1 economists had research interests which were "less academic than technical," and geared toward methods for storing and processing data. The host, "with very little advance information about how I could help them," spent considerable time getting a clear idea of their specific needs. "As a result, I found myself trying to make appointments, to arrange visits and interviews at very short notice and sometimes unsuccessfully."[71] Another 1(C)1 host in a similar case wrote the Council regarding the visits of two Soviet computer scientists. "To the extent I could discover what their real interests were, I would certainly have been able to suggest a much more meaningful series of meetings in Canada for them . . . ."[72] Even in nontechnical social scientific fields, research interest may be mismatched. A certain Soviet historian "was very amiable," wrote his

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[71]Ibid.

[72]Letter to Canada Council, 22 October 1975.

host, although "his field of interest is as far removed from mine as India is from the West Mediterranean."[73] The need to press the Academy for more detailed information, and to arrange more careful placement is further emphasized by the following comment from a McGill professor of industrial relations:

> . . . on a personal basis I found [the exchange scholar] to be a charming, pleasant and delightful individual. However, we are not satisfied that the Canada Council's purposes in sponsoring such individuals are met, given the conditions which prevail around these visits . . . . It is not until a visitor arrives and one meets him/her face-to-face that one learns exactly what the visitor is hoping to study and whom he or she wishes to see. Consequently, there is a great deal of last minute rushing around, improvisation, sudden demands on colleagues . . . I would make a plea that before any more [visits] . . . some consultation be undertaken with those who are left with the responsibility of seeing to it that the visits are productive.[74]

A second major complaint concerns costs. Host expenses for a Soviet 1(D)1 or 1(D)2 scientist - who mostly settle in at one university for five or 10 months - are quite different from those incurred for a Soviet social scientist who travels about for six weeks on a program directed toward a wide acquaintance with as many Canadian institutions as possible. Indirect costs in science or engineering are sometimes covered in whole or in part by grant monies, and compensated for by the addition of Soviet manpower to a university laboratory. This is not the case in the social sciences or the humanities. In lieu of even a small Canada Council grant for the inevitable entertainment expenses, the money has come out of individual professorial pockets and from shrinking departmental budgets. Indeed, complaints seem to have grown in recent years in direct proportion to cuts in university funding, and hence to the increased stringency of departmental allocations. It is also clear that on the "who pays for what" question, there is sometimes a communication gap between the Council and the host university, as well as between the Council and the individual Soviet scholar. Under 1(C)1, there is a $200 allowance for photocopying and book purchasing but hosts don't always know, and are frequently unaware, that they

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[73]Letter to Canada Council, 27 January 1978.

[74]Letter to Canada Council, 25 January 1978.

cannot claim reimbursement for faculty club luncheons and other hospitality costs. Soviet scholars are either often misinformed, or they behave disingenuously. For example, at the time of the visit to McGill by the exchange scholar mentioned above, the Montreal subway workers were on strike. According to her host, "the taxi fares were extremely costly. We have no budget for such trips . . . she seemed to think it was our responsibility to pick up these expenses for taxis and meals. Because she was such a nice person, I didn't want to discuss or argue the matter."[75]

The scholar may simply have had trouble living on her stipend. As one host told the Council:

> I was astonished to discover that these visitors were having to subsist on $14 per day (apart from hotel and travel). I trust that you realize that it is very difficult even to have three meals a day on this amount in cities like Vancouver and Montreal, especially for an unfamiliar foreigner. There may be good reason for the inadequacy of this allowance - I suspect it is embroiled in our cultural exchange agreement. I want to emphasize to you, however, that it is not only insufficient, but it adds to the burden carried by their hosts . . . .[76]

In reply, the Council stressed that as in the case of the 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 programs, the rate of subsistence is determined on a reciprocal basis, and it is the responsibility of the sending country to supplement the stipend. "Recognizing that the subsistence allowance paid by the host country is likely insufficient, the Government of Canada gives an additional $100 a month to Canadian scholars conducting research in the USSR . . . We can only hope," the Council added, "the Soviet authorities would do the same for their own scholars and avoid their creating embarrassment to the Canadian institution receiving them."[77] In point of fact, 12 rubles is an adequate sum in the USSR. Its dollar equivalent obviously is not.

Lesser complaints that have plagued the 1(C)1 program from its inception, but that have never been adequately resolved, include the

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[75]Ibid.

[76]Letter, 14 November 1977. The equivalent of 12 rubles was then $14.40. It is now $18.60.

[77]Letter from Canada Council, 29 November 1977.

too short notice of impending visits and the extraordinary and unremunerated demand on host time, particularly during end-of-term periods in December and May. The McGill visitor's visit encompassed "virtually two weeks of nonstop guiding and social obligations." Comments from professors at the University of Toronto, the institution which has hosted since 1974 all but four of the Soviet 1(C)1 scholars, summed up the irritations in a letter, with an accompanying internal memorandum, to the Council in May 1977. "To be quite honest," the correspondent wrote, "I am dissatisfied with our performance, with that of the Soviets, and with the Canada Council's performance under the present arrangements." In the most recent incident, four Soviet scholars had arrived all at once on a Tuesday, at a time confirmed only the day before. All wanted to go to Niagara Falls the next day because one was leaving Thursday; arrangements for interviews thus had to be revised, a trying problem because the following Monday was Victoria Day. One of the four was Director of an Academy of Sciences research institute, who should have been "treated as . . . a personality in his own right."

> Our entertainment account is, however, not very substantial, and . . . [I] had long previously planned to take that week to write a scholarly paper which was overdue. My secretary was typing portions of it, but there were calls from the Canada Council, requests from the Soviet visitors and so on to distract her . . . . What I would really like to say is that it is difficult to be a good host under such circumstances; that the Soviets should not be coming to the university in May, and should have money and other matters very clearly understood and planned; that when there are more than two Soviets travelling together, the Canada Council should consider accompanying them with a guide who would, by advance telephone to the university departments concerned, have set up a complete itinerary and schedule in advance, and that the Council should take a much firmer hand in the management of Soviet activities here, assigning the personnel to do the job properly and professionally.

One of the professor's colleagues additionally noted that "descriptions of knowledge of English are not standardized and frequently bear scant relation to actual fluency. Translations of academic qualifications are sometimes inaccurate . . . . No notice is afforded of visitors' special attributes and needs . . . . Financial arrangements are thoroughly unsatisfactory . . . ."

> The difficulties we have catalogued here do not comprise a random checklist of oversights and complaints to us. They suggest an overall lack of purpose and will which, unwittingly or not, shifts the costs of carrying the program [though] our shoulders . . . are ill-suited to bearing them . . . .[78]

These comments helped spur a letter from the Council to the Academy in August 1977, complaining about last minute changes in itineraries - going off "for example on a purely touristic visit to Niagara Falls" - and about candidates not having "enough Canadian currency . . . to meet expenses in Canada not covered by the Agreement." The letter suggested that no more than two scholars should come to Canada at the same time to work on the same subject; that no visit should start in the first two weeks of September or during April, May or the latter part of December; and that the scholar's information sheet should be more specific about the research program envisaged and the extent of language competence. In answer the Academy assured the Council that the suggestions would be taken into consideration, but added that the USSR did not attach too much importance to "minor" problems, assuming that "all will be eventually resolved through cooperation."[79]

The correspondence with the Academy appears to be the only Canada Council response to the difficulties described by the University of Toronto and other hosts. Responsibility for all problems apparently was assigned primarily to the Soviet Union. In retrospect, the Council seems to have been either unwilling or unable to examine Toronto's charge that administration of the program indicated an "overall lack of purpose . . ." The Toronto memorandum made "two major requests" of the Canada Council which were not acted upon, but which are now being considered by the Office of International Relations of the SSHRC:

> The first is that it undertake a careful review of the visiting scholar's program in consultation with us and other host institutions. The second is that it make a commitment to assume a more thorough responsibility for the operations of the program.

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[78]All of the above quotations are from letters to the Canada Council dated 26 May and 30 May 1977.

[79]Council letter to the Academy, 16 August 1977. Letter from the Acting Head, Foreign Relations Department, Academy of Sciences, 8 September 1977.

"I certainly recognize," the Toronto correspondent added, "that the exchange has some valuable purposes to serve, and trust that a way will be found to reorganize the handling of the Soviet visits to the greater advantage of all."[80]

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[80]See footnote 78.

V CONCLUSION

Host evaluation of the Council/Academy program again points clearly to the absence of academic influence on policy-making. It is one of the ironies of the exchange that a program which required university resources and cooperation in hosting 137 Soviet scholars, and which was used by 116 Canadian students and professors, should have been developed and implemented with so little input from the academic community. In part, the community itself was responsible. The constitution of its most representative group, the Inter-University Council on Academic Exchanges with the USSR and Eastern Europe, declares these specific objectives:

> To promote, encourage, implement, coordinate, and organize exchanges of faculty members and graduate students . . . .
> To cooperate with other Canadian institutions - such as the Canada Council, National Research Council, the AUCC - as well as with the External Affairs Department, in improving the operation of the existing exchanges . . . .
> To accumulate, analyze, and disseminate information concerning academic exchanges with the USSR . . . .[81]

In light of the facts presented in this report, the inability of the I-UC fully to carry out its mandate may be apparent. In seeming recognition of its ineffectiveness, the Canadian Association of Slavists is now considering the establishment of a new body, a Working Group on External Relations, with a commitment to policy formulation and the collation of experience.

External Affairs and the AUCC did try to bring the universities into the planning for the four Mixed Commisssion meetings held between 1972 and 1978. Such sporadic efforts were not well coordinated, however, and they produced little in the way of practical advice. Academic participation in the Mixed Commission was largely token. In policy planning, all agencies involved were conscientious and well-meaning, but they lacked the expertise for ongoing qualitative evaluation. The absence of this expertise shows in a variety of ways: in the definition of a "young scholar"; in the lack of preparation given Canadian candidates; in the petty restrictions imposed in the interests of reciprocity (while real reciprocity in numbers was not being attained); in the missing sense of purpose; and in the failure

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[81]Constitution adopted at the 1973 meetings of the Learned Societies at Queen's University, with one amendment in 1976.

to grasp the importance of accumulating and correlating all information and experience. The need for establishment of an information system, and of a regular mechanism for academic monitoring, review and discussion is paramount.

Operation of the program would also be much improved by closer interdepartmental coordination. The difficulties created by short institutional memory at External Affairs were exacerbated in 1978-79 by the extraordinary problems posed in the transition of Canada Council functions to the SSHRC. With very little guidance and no book of procedures, the staff had difficulty coping with day-to-day complexities. There were slow-downs and mix-ups of all kinds, including failure to meet candidates on arrival, two-month delays in issuance of stipends, and stalling on Soviet visa applications because External Affairs had not been informed of acceptances under the Council/Academy exchange. Mix-ups at External Affairs, and External's failure to consult more closely, also produced problems for SSHRC. The Council submitted its nominations in time for the February 20 deadline on 1(D)1 candidates, but External was late transmitting them to Moscow. Similarly, the Council received Soviet 1(D)2 nominations past the deadline, partly because External delayed after they had been transmitted, and then sent them to the wrong agency. From the Soviet point of view, Canadian performance in the last year may look something like Canada's perspective on MINVUZ. Problems of coordination with the Visits Panel and Academic Relations division in External Affairs were not confined to the AUCC and SSHRC. The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council also complained of cumbersome bureaucracy, and of delays with visas for approved visits by Soviet scientists. As SSHRC pointed out, if Canadians wish to compel Soviet adherence to deadlines, if we are to take a "strong stand" on matters of reciprocity and fair treatment of scholars, "we have to be prepared to follow through on our own side, and this requires concerted action."[82]

Concerted action might be ensured (and further administrative chaos avoided) if External Affairs, as the lead agency, set up an interagency coordinating committee. Such a committee was informally convened prior to the Moscow meeting on placement of 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 candidates in May 1979. Constituted on a regular basis, and made up of officials from NSERC as well as from External Affairs, AUCC and SSHRC, it would provide a valuable forum for the ongoing exchange of views and information. As a first task, such a committee might consider working out a clear definition of operating principles and procedures - a step that would certainly ease future problems of

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[82]Memorandum to External Affairs from the Head of International Scholarly Programs, 27 February 1979.

transition. Such a committee might also serve the development of closer ties between AUCC and SSHRC with NSERC. Given the high percentage of Soviet 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 candidates who are scientists and engineers, and the experience to date of many young Canadian scientists in the USSR, more cooperation seems essential. The committee could also, in concert with parallel considerations by an academic review committee, look at the broader policy issues. For example, both the academic community and participating agencies should seriously examine alternatives to continuing the dual administration of clause 1(D)2.

Effective interdepartmental consultation and the infusion of a strong academic voice into the policy process has been suggested to put Canada into an improved position at the 1979 meeting of the Mixed Commission. The Soviets indicated they might be willing to drop clause 1(D)5 from the program for 1980-81, scheduled for negotiation in November 1979. Certainly, the clause has not functioned well, has generated little benefit, and should not have been made reciprocal at the 1978 meeting of the Mixed Commission. The provisions under clauses 1(C)1 and 1(D)1 are adequate for senior scholars wishing to carry out a few weeks of research and clause 1(D)2 for junior scholars could be opened for shorter-term stays. In addition, the entire basis for candidate qualification under clause 1(D)2 should be reexamined in view of the findings contained in this report. The "35 and under" age determinant, inserted on Canadian insistency at the 1978 meeting of the Mixed Commission, does not work to Canadian advantage. Canada should be sending candidates who are more mature in years and scholarly attainment - primarily doctoral students and assistant professors. By admitting to the 1(D)2 exchange young faculty who wish to spend an academic term, or year, in the USSR, officials would also strengthen the case for a reduction in the quota of 1(D)1 professors. At the 1978 Mixed Commission meeting, Canadians tried unsuccessfully to lower the quota from 10 professors for up to 40 man-months to seven professors for up to 30. The Soviets will undoubtedly resist any reduction in numbers, but officials might want to try again.

Apart from these suggested modifications in clauses 1(D)1 and 1(D)2, and the proposed elimination of clause 1(D)5, the recommendations contained within the study centre not on an immediate need for negotiations with the USSR, but on changes in the administration of the program. The report has detailed host perceptions of a frequently uncoordinated operation, with mismatched interests, unanticipated costs, petty restrictions and other bureaucratic burdens, combining to erode university confidence in the government's ability to run a useful exchange of scholars. Notwithstanding such problems, and the occasional encounter with lazy or incompetent Soviet candidates, the majority of hosts - particularly those who have participated under clauses 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 - see

significant value in the exchange. Similarly, the majority of those who have travelled to the Soviet Union, especially under the provisions of clause 1(C)1, believe they have benefited substantially. Even among scholars who described serious problems of archival access, limitations on travel and other obstacles, most viewed the overall experience as a rewarding one. Their comments on the general worthiness of the program underline the proposition that with improvements, the exchange could be made more valuable.

The methodological problems noted in the preface, combined with a four-month time limitation for all research and writing, have resulted in the neglect of certain important factors. The report alludes only briefly to the role of the Canadian Embassy, although participants have widely and warmly praised the often heroic efforts undertaken on their behalf. The study also neglects the broader diplomatic framework although academic exchange is frequently a sensititve barometer of shifts in the political wind. Any revision would also draw more extensively on the comparative experience of other countries, through the use of secondary source materials and discussions, where possible. A planned interview with IREX83 officials in New York has not yet taken place. Except for scattered references to the impact of inflation on language training, travel and similar expenses, economic considerations have also been neglected. Coping with the Canada Council's financial files would have taken many more weeks of work. Perhaps the major deficiency of the report, however, is the perspective created by an isolated look at only those clauses inherited by the SSHRC. Any wider use of the study as a discussion paper would require analysis of other Canada/USSR academic exchanges - notably the NRC agreement now administered by NSERC, the Carleton-Leningrad exchange, the new Dalhousie-Pushkin program, and a mushrooming of other links (e.g., Alberta, Saskatchewan, York). There is probably a final irony in the fact that the General Exchanges Agreement was initially signed, in part, to prevent this kind of proliferation - to attain balance and reciprocity through a cohesive national approach.

83United States International Review and Exchange Board.

Appendix 1

SUMMARY OF SOVIET EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

ADMINISTERED BY THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES RESEARCH COUNCIL

1(D)1 Intergovernmental exchange, financed on the Canadian side by the Department of External Affairs.

Ten "professors and specialists" on each side are exchanged annually for research visits of from one to five months.

The SSHRC is responsible for the selection of Canadian candidates and the placement of Soviet nominees. The administrative agency on the Soviet side is the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education.

1(D)2 Intergovernmental exchange, financed on the Canadian side by the Department of External Affairs.

Ten "graduate students and young postdoctoral scholars in principle not older than 35" on each side are exchanged annually for up to 10 months for study or research.

The AUCC selects Canadian participants, while the SSHRC places Soviet nominees. The administrative agency on the Soviet side is the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education.

1(C)1 Exchange agreement between the SSHRC and Academy of Sciences of the USSR financed on the Canadian side by the SSHRC.

Exchange of up to 10 scholars annually in the humanities and social sciences to conduct research and give lectures.

SSHRC responsible for the selection of Canadians and the placement of Soviets.

1(D)5* Exchange agreement between the SSHRC and the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, financed on the Canadian side by the SSHRC.

Exchange of up to seven scholars to conduct research "primarily in institutions of higher learning."

SSHRC responsible for the selection of Canadians and the placement of Soviets.

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*Inactive

Appendix 2

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Policy Requiring Consideration by the SSHRC

1. Canada Council staff never developed a mechanism for regular qualitative evaluation of the 1(C)1, 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 programs. The experience of candidates and hosts are obviously important decision-making tools. Their views should be available for dissemination and discussion. This year for the first time, hosts are being asked to judge, in writing, Soviet candidate performance. The new practice should be continued, with Canadian candidate and host reports correlated each year, and statistics carefully gathered, to ensure accurate future appraisals of the exchange. This will provide the basis for the more effective formulation of policy.

2. The absence of a strong academic voice in policy-making is a central theme of the report. The Council should establish a regular mechanism for the academic monitoring and review of experience under the 1(D)1, 1(D)2 and 1(C)1 exchanges. Such a mechanism could be set up through an ad hoc committee on exchanges with the USSR and Eastern Europe, or created by assigning a policy advisory role to the existing academic committee on selection of professor nominees.

3. The National Research Council exchange with the Academy of Sciences, now administered by NSERC, fully services the needs and interests of the dozen or so senior scholars in the pure and applied sciences who annually seek to visit the USSR. From the standpoint of these senior scientists, therefore, an agreement with MINVUZ (clause 1(D)1) is not necessary. But Soviet universities control libraries and other resources which are important to the interested community of social scientists and humanists. Canadian professors in Slavic languages, literature, history, geography, psychology, political science and other such fields need channels permitting access to both Soviet universities (clause 1(D)1) and to the Academy of Sciences (clause 1(C)1).

4. Canadian academic interest in the exchange of senior scholars has remained fairly constant (Table 5, p. 16). This year for the first time, applications for the 1(C)1 Council/Academy of Sciences exchange were invited directly, instead of being culled indirectly from other sources. The result was an increase in the number of applicants and the strongest slate of 1(C)1 candidates to date. To help attract highly qualified candidates in a broader mix of the social sciences or humanities, and to encourage the participation of more female scholars, the Council should continue to advertise the Academy exchange. The point could be made that while Russian language competence is desirable, in some fields and for some kinds of research, it is not always necessary (pp. 54 and 55).

5. Canadian students travelling to the Soviet Union under the 1(D)2 exchange of junior scholars have had the benefit of a handbook since the second year of the exchange. Professors have not enjoyed this advantage, and many have felt ill-prepared. The need for a briefing book is pressing. Some of the information requirements are listed in the report (p. 62). Staff should assemble a handbook in consultation with External Affairs, other interested agencies, and experienced candidates.

6. Only one Maritime university has ever hosted a Soviet 1(D)2 junior scholar. Maritime universities, and universities in Manitoba and Saskatchewan have never hosted a 1(D)1 senior scholar. The Maritimes and two Prairie provinces are also underrepresented as hosts on the 1(C)1 Council/Academy exchange, where two universities - Toronto and Carleton - have borne a disproportionate share of the host burden. In arranging placement for Soviet scientists and social scientists, staff should try to involve a wider segment of the university community.

7. Hosts have found the organizational red tape and some petty procedures insisted upon by the Canada Council in the name of reciprocity to be extremely irritating. Irreconcilable differences in Soviet and Canadian lifestyles, and in the systems of providing accommodation for foreign scholars, should be recognized and not made susceptible to considerations of reciprocity. Staff should examine the more aggravating "tit-for-tat" aspects of the operation (pp. 37-39) with an eye to their elimination. Staff should also take over from hosts the responsibility for arranging housing, and consider some means of supplementing the research travel allowance.

8. A host's duties are time-consuming and often expensive. For short-term visitors, the Council should consider provision of a contingency fund to cover entertainment expenses, photocopying costs and other incidentals. For longer-term visitors, the Council should also consider a small basic grant to assist hosts with minor expenses (computer time, drafting, slide-making, etc.) related to joint research projects.

9. Professors in departments of Russian or Soviet Studies are usually unaware that there are Soviet students on campus, working in engineering or science departments. The circulation of such information by the Council would have obvious potential advantage for Canadian students of Russian language and society.

10. Consideration of economy, as well as reciprocity, would seem to preclude the possibility suggested by some hosts of a Council "grant-in-aid" for major purchases of equipment and research material. Every effort must be made, therefore, to integrate the interests of Soviet scholars into existing laboratory projects. The short, four to five month period available to a 1(D)1 scientist makes it additionally important that the needs of a Soviet researcher fit within a host's ongoing research.

11. Careful placement, together with improved communication between the Council and hosts, should prevent future misunderstandings on the questions of large expenditures for Soviet researchers. When the funding questions have been settled, staff should prepare a briefing booklet for hosts, fully describing the characteristics of the 1(C)1, 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 programs, and carefully setting out guidelines on the "who pays for what" issue.

12. The internal travel provision for 1(D)2 junior scholars should be retained. There is a strong consensus among hosts that it is an integral part of the program. Senior scientists who come to Canada under clause 1(D)1 exhibit work patterns similar to those of their junior colleagues who visit under clause 1(D)2. They tend to stay in one place until the last week or two of their term, when they undertake a quick tour of other universities and research facilities. The internal travel patterns of Soviet social scientists are different, and appear to represent an unreciprocal aspect of the 1(C)1 Council/Academy program. All Soviet 1(C)1 candidates stop in at least three Canadian cities and two-thirds visit at least four. Only 10 percent of senior Canadian candidates, on the other hand, stop in three or four Soviet cities. Ninety percent of Canadian scholars have only

one or two destinations in the USSR, primarily because Soviet research faciliites are more highly centralized than are similar centres in Canada. Nevertheless, if important savings could be effected, the Council might consider putting some limit on Soviet academic touring under the 1(C)1 exchange - especially among those 25% who seek to visit five or more places in Canada. Data presented in the report (p. 51) also offer the basis for negotiation with the Academy, to assure more extensive travel for those Canadian scholars who want it.

II. Policy Requiring Consideration by Other Agencies, Alone or in Concert with SSHRC.

13. Delays, mix-ups and other operational problems are not always the fault of the Soviets. The administration of the 1(D)1, 1(D)2 and 1(C)1 programs would be substantially improved by closer interdepartmental coordination. Canadians will not be in the best position to insist on the fair treatment of Canadian scholars unless they themselves scrupulously adhere to deadlines, and issue visas on time. Since External Affairs is at present the lead department, that agency should consider creation of an interdepartmental coordinating committee on academic exchanges with the USSR and Eastern Europe. Such a committee might work under the aegis of the Visits Panel, although it should be composed of officials from other interested bureaus within External as well as from SSHRC, NSERC and the AUCC. The committee might have both an operational and policy role. Some suggested functions are outlined in the report (pp. 75 and 76).

14. Student handbooks should be brought up to date. Students should also be fully briefed before departure by the AUCC, former embassy personnel and other experienced administrators, as well as by former exchange students who are living in the Ottawa area. If it is too expensive to bring every junior candidate to Ottawa, then at least those in the Ottawa-Montreal-Kingston environs (a number comprising almost half, to date, of all Canada 1(D)2 scholars) could be briefed and given the responsibility of passing on to their colleagues what they have learned (p. 35).

15. The AUCC does not require follow-up reports from 1(D)2 candidates. However, the collation of student experience will be important in the establishment of an overall information system. The AUCC should ask now for a written evaluation of each scholar's term in the USSR as a condition of the grant.

16. Only five or six percent of all scientific research in the USSR takes place in the universities which are under MINVUZ jurisdiction. Although predoctoral candidates are not eligible for the NRC/Academy exchange, access to institutes affiliated with the Academy of Sciences is often essential for the junior scientists proceeding to the USSR under clause 1(D)2. This fact, plus the need for laboratory space and specialized equipment, means that no Canadian science students should be sent to a Soviet university simply on MINVUZ say-so, without a direct commitment from the appropriate university department or additional invitation from a research institute. Closer consultation and coordination between the AUCC, SSHRC, and NRC/NSERC would help in arranging prior contacts, and in encouraging a larger number of applications from science students.

17. At the January 1978 meeting of the Mixed Commission, Canadian negotiators unsuccessfully sought Soviet agreement to the imposition of a fixed quota (40%) of social scientists and humanists among 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 Soviet scholars for 1978-1979. The Soviets argued that the imbalance worked both ways and that Canada was not sending senior scientists under 1(D)1, or a sufficiently high proportion of junior scientists under 1(D)2. The report discusses the structural problem of trying to attract scientists to the 1(D)1 exchange. With approximately 95 percent of all scientific research in the USSR carried out in the institutes affiliated with the Academy of Sciences, senior Canadian scholars in pure or applied science naturally prefer to employ the NRC/Academy channel. A comparison with the US/USSR exchange of junior scholars also suggests that the imbalance of disciplines under clause 1(D)2 may not be as unsatisfactory or as disadvantageous as officials have thought (p.32). Administrators should additionally recognize that the basic Soviet orientation toward western science and technology is not likely to alter, and that the exchange of social scientists will thus continue to take place primarily under those agreements which, like clause 1(C)1, exclude scholars in the hard sciences.

At the 1978 meeting of the Mixed Commission, a sentence was inserted into the program for 1978-1979 encouraging "both sides" to achieve a "more balanced representation" of fields. This phrase should be retained, but Canadians should also realize that the imbalance is created not only by varying scholarly interests, but by basic differences in institutional organization. Therefore, officials should not expect significant changes, and should not again attempt to impose a fixed quota of social scientists or humanists under clauses 1(D)1 or 1(D)2.

18. Americans who go to the USSR under the United States IREX student exchange have an advantage over Canadian students because they arrive with many of their forms, authorizations and other types of bureaucratic paperwork completed. The Canadian Embassy in Moscow has strongly suggested that External Affairs and the AUCC consider a similar system, establishing a series of "conditions precedent" to be negotiated with the USSR (pp. 34-35). Consultation with IREX officials in New York should be undertaken immediately, with a view to acting on the embassy's suggestion at the next meeting of the Mixed Commission.

19. American students in the USSR are also at an advantage because they are older and more advanced than Canadians. Canadian participants in the 1(D)2 exchange are similarly much younger than and academically far junior to their Soviet counterparts (Tables 9 and 10, pp. 25-27). In light of the data revealed in the report (pp. 25-27), officials should re-examine the basis for Canadian and Soviet 1(D)2 qualification. The "not older than 35" age provision should be dropped; the exchange should be opened to young assistant professors; candidates should be able to stay for an academic term or for an entire academic year; Canada should send far fewer candidates at the master's level.

In assessing the eligibility of Soviet nominees, officials should pay less attention to the age of a "junior scholar," and more attention to the number of publications and years of postdegree experience.

20. Participants in the 1(D)2 exchange of junior scholars should continue to be Canadian citizens, but political criteria should not be a factor in the selection process. The University of Toronto exchange in the 1960s sponsored Canadians solely on the basis of their scholarly merit and ability to carry out a proposed research project. A return to purely academic criteria would still assure Canada the best possible representatives - those top calibre, highly qualified nominees with the greatest chance of succeeding in their particular areas of endeavour.

21. The administration of clause 1(D)2 by two different agencies - AUCC for the Canadian side and SSHRC for the Soviet side - has not worked to the advantage of Canadian junior scholars, and complicates the effort to attain reciprocity. Participating agencies and External Affairs should seriously consider consolidating the present arrangement under the aegis of one or the other organization.

22. Before the introduction of a "strict reciprocity" policy in 1978 (p. 15), the Canada Council was tolerating a 32 percent rejection rate of professors and specialists under clause 1(D)1, while turning away less than three percent of counterparts from the USSR. (The rate of refusal under clause 1(D)2 was much less, perhaps as a result of some preselection for less sensitive topics by AUCC nominating committees.) In the interests of both senior and junior scholars, officials should continue to enforce strict reciprocity. The asymmetry evident in the 1(D)1 exchange (Table 4, p. 14) may gradually be corrected in numbers, if not in man-months. Soviet refusals and rejections have not been a major problem under the 1(C)1 Council/Academy exchange.

23. Refusals, delays and other difficulties in the operation of clauses 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 should be examined not just in terms of Soviet intractability, but also as products of Soviet institutional peculiarities and essential cultural differences. In future dealings with MINVUZ, officials should base their expectations on an awareness of past problems posed by an inert, ponderously heavy Soviet bureaucracy, and on an understanding of the overriding dilemma - MINVUZ's lack of influence with the Academy institutes and other ministries in the Soviet hierarchy.

24. Perceptions of a frequently uncoordinated operation - replete with mismatched research interests, unanticipated costs, and seemingly petty restrictions - have eroded academic confidence in the Canadian government's ability to run a useful exchange of scholars. Universities are returning increasingly to the pattern of the 1960s - individual exchange agreements with counterpart organizations in the USSR. These arrangements are encouraged by the USSR because fragmentation works to the overall advantage of the highly centralized Soviets. To attain balance and reciprocity, Canadians require a coherent, national approach. If the Council is able to regain university confidence, the further proliferation of autonomous links with Soviet institutions may be discouraged. Either way, there will continue to be an urgent need for an ongoing exchange of information and general harmonization of policy among those in the public and private sectors who are involved in academic exchanges with the Soviet Union.

III. Policy Requiring Negotiation with the USSR

25. If a decision is made to open the 1(D)2 exchange of junior scholars to young assistant professors, and to allow more flexibility in the length of stay, then Canadians will have additional grounds for a) the elimination of clause 1(D)5, and b) a reduction in the quota of 1(D)1 professors.

    i) The Soviets have indicated they might be willing to drop clause 1(D)5 from the program for 1980-1981. This clause permits the placement of seven scholars for periods of up to six weeks. As the report shows (pp. 18-20), the 1(D)5 program has not functioned well, has generated little benefit, and should not have been put on a reciprocal basis at the 1978 meeting of the Mixed Commission. The provisions under clauses 1(C)1 and 1(D)1 are adequate for senior scholars wishing to carry out a few weeks of research, and clause 1(D)2 for junior scholars could be changed to permit shorter periods of study.

    ii) By admitting to the 1(D)2 exchange young faculty who wish to spend an academic term, or year, in the Soviet Union, officials would also strengthen the case for a reduction in the quota of 1(D)1 professors. At the Mixed Commission meeting in January 1978, Canadians tried unsuccessfully to lower the quota from 10 professors for up to 40 man-months to seven professors for up to 30. The Soviets will undoubtedly resist any reduction in numbers, but officials may want to try again (pp. 12-14).

    iii) The 1(D)2 quota was reduced from 15 to 10 at the last meeting of the Mixed Commission and should remain as constituted. Given the increasing number of applications over the last two years (Table 1, p. 10), and the possibility of opening the exchange to assistant professors, it clearly would not be in the interests of Canadian scholars to lower the numbers further.

26. One of the suggested changes in clause 1(D)2, contained within Recommendation #17, will require the concurrence of Soviet authorities. As worded, the clause already permits the exchange of assistant professors ("young postdoctoral scholars"), and shorter stays (terms of "up to 10 months"). However, the "in principle not older than 35" phrase, insisted upon by the Canadian side at the last meeting of the Mixed Commission, should now be removed.

27. A system of "conditions precedent" discussed in the report (pp. 34-35), and in Recommendation #18, will also require negotiation with Soviet authorities.

28. Canadians hosting Soviet scholars under the 1(C)1, 1(D)1 and 1(D)2 programs have all regularly complained about the inadequacy of advance information on the research needs and interests of their guests. To help formulate a better assessment, officials should ask the Soviets to list all publications on their data sheets, and to send copies (even if these are in Russian) of papers directly related to the proposed course of research in Canada.